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I. THE CURRENT TENSIONS
Corporate governance is the term currently used to describe corporate reform
efforts, although it does not pertain to any single program of reform. Federalism, of
course, is a much older term that refers to the relationship between federal and state
law. The linkage of these old and new ideas suggests that it is fruitful to explore the
role that federal law, or the federal government, plays in the regulation of the internal
affairs of corporations and whether federal law should serve as a means of reforming
corporate behavior or corporate law.
This Article will explore initially some of the impetus for corporate reform with
particular attention to reform of the manner in which corporations are internally
governed. The Article then will examine the prevailing law of corporate governance
and the respective roles under present law that are performed by state and federal law.
With this background, the Article then will comment upon the federalism issues
under the existing arrangement and will examine some of the proposals for change.
Finally, a suggested role for federal law will be offered.
It is difficult to define with any precision the phrase corporate governance.
Corporate governance, as it will be used in this paper, relates to the rules that define
the organization of the governing structure of the corporation. 1 In the main, this
means the rules that determine who manages the corporation and by what process
they manage. Historically, corporate governance might have been confined to the
rules governing the board of directors because, until recently, all corporation statutes
in the United States provided that the business of the corporation shall be managed by
the board of directors. 2 The statutory rules prescribed the role of the board of direc-
tors relative to the shareholders. Today, the identification of the governing body is
more complex because we recognize a role for management, not a formal body
acknowledged by statute, but nonetheless the dominant governing force.
New questions about the board's function have replaced such mundane subjects
as the quorum required for board meetings and whether informal action may be taken
or whether meetings may be held by conference call. Today the key questions include
whether an audit committee and a nominating committee are needed, whether the
board should be composed of a majority of outside directors, whether directors
should perform the function of monitoring senior management, and what that func-
tion means.
Corporate governance also includes the subject of enforcement and remedies
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available to the governed-the shareholders. The governance scheme might also
conceivably provide certain rights in favor of other groups or constituencies that are
interested in the conduct of the corporation, such as employees and citizens of the
community where the corporation functions.
Finally, I deem corporate governance to include the business judgment rule,
which operates as a shield against liability of the governors. Equally important, the
business judgment doctrine serves as a sword in the hands of managers, authorizing
them to act for the corporation in particular respects. 4 The doctrine is related to the
law of agency, which is also an aspect of corporate governance, but the business
judgment rule's principles are uniquely adapted to the large, publicly owned corpora-
tion.
Corporate governance is not coextensive with corporation law-a broader sub-
ject. Corporation law includes the substantive rules that define the proper exercise of
authority by corporate governors and creates the fiduciary duties and the duty of due
care to which managers are subject. Corporation law also imposes certain limits on
the corporation itself and not on those who manage it. And the law of corporations, as
Professor Conard has taught us, is broader still.5
Why is so much attention paid to corporate governance and corporate reform at
this time? It has been more than a generation since the inner workings of the corpora-
tion and the subject of corporation law have been scrutinized as they are today. 6 The
American Law Institute Project, now formally known as "Principles of Corporate
Governance and Structure: Analysis and Recommendations" ("ALI Project"), au-
thorized by the Institute in 1981, has produced one tentative draft7 thus far, plus a
virtual firestorm of controversy over its initial recommendations. 8 Subsequent drafts
are in the process of preparation. In addition, legislative proposals for fundamental
corporate reform were introduced in Congress in the late 1970s9 , and hearings were
held by several committees examining possible legislative reform.'O The Securities
and Exchange Commission, under the leadership of President Carter's Chairman,
Harold M. Williams, assigned high priority to the subject of corporate governance.t"
Corporate governance has been the topic of numerous symposia' 2 and
4. Hinsey, Maldonado (N.Y.) v. Maldonado (DE): Which Prevails?, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 4, 1980, at 18,
20, col. 3.
5. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 3 (1976).
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
7. (Tent. Draft No. 1 1982). Tentative Drafts Nos. 2 and 3 were published in 1984.
8. The strongest and most comprehensive statement in opposition was issued by the Business Roundtable, and was
prepared by the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. See Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law
Institute's Proposed Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations (February,
1983).
9. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
10. E.g., Protection of Shareholders Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Corporate Rights and
Responsibilities: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
11. STAFF OF Div. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH
CoNG., 2D SEsS. REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABLILITY (Comm. Print 1980).
12. See COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: THE ALI-ABA SYmPOSiUmS 1977-1978
(D. Schwartz ed. 1979) (hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES); National Conference on Corporate Governance and
Accountability in the 1980's (1981).
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has received much scholarly attention, 13 which has increased since the publication of
the ALI's first tentative draft.
14
The present movement is the third serious effort at corporate reform during this
century. In the early 1900s, active consideration was given to federalizing the law of
corporations, and both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft
made proposals. 15 The impelling force behind reform at that time was the increase in
corporate concentration, symbolized by the creation of huge trusts in several basic
industries. Some regulatory legislation and an increased determination by the govern-
ment to enforce the antitrust laws emerged.16
Following World War I, a mood of euphoria about American business swept the
country and scant attention was paid to reform. But after the Depression and the
beginnings of the New Deal, interest revived in corporate reform. A vast amount of
regulatory legislation was enacted, and Congress at least contemplated the possibility
of federal chartering of corporations.' 7 That idea, we are reminded, originated with
James Madison at the Constitutional Convention and not with any radical politicians
of the 1930s.' 8 The Temporary National Economic Commission (TNEC) had a large
agenda of proposed reforms, all of which were halted abruptly by the onset of World
War H. No one explanation can suffice for the revived interest in basic corporate
reform in the 1930s, except that most of the different strands of thought were
Depression-related. That is, many believed that the business system had failed and
that corporations needed fundamental changes. Berle and Means, as already noted,
pointed to the separation of ownership from control, placing a worrisome amount of
power in the hands of managers who were not effectively accountable for its exercise.
13. See Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61
B.U.L. Rsv. 623 (1981); Earle, Corporate Governance and the Outside Director-A Modest Proposal, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 787 (1979); Fischel, Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VA.D. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Greene, Edward F.
Greene on Corporate Governance (The World of the'80's), 37 Bus. LAW. 228 (1981); Knauss, Corporate Governance-
A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REv. 478 (1981); Letts, Corporate Governance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505
(1980); Parkinson, The Modification of Directors' Duties, 1981 J. Bus. L. 335; Sealy, A Reply to Professor Kripke: The
Negative, Not the Positive, Is the Real Issue of Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAW. 1655 (1981); Small, The Evolving
Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1979); Weiss, Social Regulation of Business
Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 343 (1981).
14. See Bayne, Lawyer and Corporate Governance: Conflict of Interest, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 400 (1982); Fisehel,
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982); Greenough & Clapman, The Role of Independent
Directors in Corporate Governance, 1982-83 CORP. PRAc. CommrErr 365 (reprinted from 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
(1981)).
15. Taft-Wickersham Federal Incorporation Bills, H.R. 20142 & S. 6186, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). See
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMisSSION REPORT, COMPILATION OF PROPOSALS AND VIEWS FOR AND AGAINST FEDERAL INCORPORA-
TION ON LICENSING OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPILATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
CONCERNING CORPORATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR ATIENTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING AND OPERATING COMPANIES,
S. Doc. No. 92, Part 69-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
16. G. KoLco, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, 64
(5th printing 1967).
17. The principal bills introduced were S. 10, 75th Cong; 1st Sess. (1937) by Senator O'Mahoney, and S. 721, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) by Senator Borah. Hearings were held in 1937 on these measures. In 1938, President Roosevelt
proposed the creation of the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), which flirted with various notions of
federal chartering. See J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORIATION OF WALL STREET at 208-210 (1982).
18. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 638 (W. Norton & Co. ed. 1966).
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More important than the philosophical musings, many changes resulted from this
concentrated effort, accomplished through a patchwork of regulatory statutes.
In the 1970s new advocates of fundamental corporate reform urged federal
chartering, or at least an enhanced federal role.1 9 These reform efforts were not
brought on by economic failings, at least not at the start of the decade, but were
mainly a social reform movement. Probably the most important group to focus on
reform of the corporations was the consumer movement, led by Ralph Nader and
others who sought to demonstrate the connection between ordinary business activity
and a wide range of social problems, including unsafe products, pollution, and race
and sex discrimination.
The reformers were a fringe movement until the revelation of widescale manage-
ment improprieties relating to illegal political contributions and improper foreign
payments. 20 In some cases, these improprieties reached the top levels of corpora-
tions. This moved the corporate reform efforts to page one of the newspapers and
aroused the concern of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Congress.
As the decade wore on, the public became increasingly disenchanted with the
corporation as an institution, along with many other institutions in society and grew
more critical of the economic performance of American corporations. 2 Frequently
our corporate system was compared unfavorably with the Japanese system;22 no
longer was it heretical to criticize American big-business and big-business leaders.
Cautious critics, led by SEC Chairman Williams, insisted that it was crucial to install
more effective accountability mechanisms within corporations. 23 In sum, reform
advocates have been impelled by perceived corporate shortcomings both with respect
to societal obligations and economic performance. Theoretically, these criticisms
appear to be inconsistent, but they may not be in a practical sense. Profit maximiza-
tion, the corporate objective according to those who espouse increasing shareholder
welfare, is not easily defined or recognized except by those who insist that market
prices for stock faithfully measure value. Others contend that profit maximization is a
long-term notion that enables managers to factor in broader community concerns
19. Ralph Nader and his colleagues popularized the idea in 1976. R. NADER, M. GPREEN, & J. SEIGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). This well-publicized effort prompted congressional interest and Senate hearings were
held. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2d.
Sess. (1976). Other academic writings also urged new federal law to govern corporations. Cary, Federalism and
Corporation Law: Reflections Upon Deleware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of
Corporations, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976).
20. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES,
SUBMITTED TO TME SENATE BANKING, HoUsING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94th Cong., 2d Seass. (May 12, 1976).
21. Kroll, Introduction by the Chairman, in COMMENTAtIES, supra note 12, at 30-31.
22. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PEOPLE AND PRODucrivrrY: A CHALLENOETO CORPORATE AMERICA (1982); R.
REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983); E. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE (1977).
23. Chairman Williams addressed this subject frequently. His speeches included the following: Corporate
Accountability, Speech at Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (January 18, 1978); The
Role of the Director in Corporate Accountability, Speech to The Economic Club of Detroit (May 1, 1978); Corporate
Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, Speech to Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar
Association (August 8, 1978); Corporate Accountability-One Year Later, Speech at Sixth Annual Securities Regulation
Institute, San Diego, California (January 18, 1979); Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power, Fairless Lecture
Series at Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa. (October 24, 1979); Corporate Accountability-A Look at Strat-
egy, Speech at Rice University, Houston, Texas (August 8, 1980).
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when making business decisions. So viewed, it is permissible in the conduct of
business to use corporate resources to reduce such externalities as environmental
burdens, unsafe products, discrimination, or other antisocial behavior. All of these
undesirable side effects were the focus of corporate critics during the 1970s and were
viewed as related, in part, to the largely unaccountable power which corporate man-
agers wielded within their organizations.
The focus of the 1970s reform movements has been on reform of the governance
process rather than on substantive law reform. 24 This response is unusual because
historically, Americans have responded to problems by addressing the symptoms, not
root causes.2 5 The governance reforms that have been proposed, however, for the
most part have reflected a hesitance to do more than tinker with the structure lest its
economic efficiency be damaged; the reforms seek to operate within the system of
privately owned and operated business and to minimize the role of government
regulation or enforcement.
26
Moreover, governance reform does not even require enabling legislation or any
other kind of legislation on a federal or state level. Reform can be, and has been in
part, voluntarily implemented on an individual basis or by the rules of self-regulatory
organizations.2 7 Efforts to compel specific reforms have uncovered deep resistance to
even modest, mandated reform. 28 Reformers undoubtedly realize that insurmountable
obstacles impede any grander program of reform. One barrier is the shareholder body
itself, which is largely disinterested in the social side of reform and has not recog-
nized a serious conflict of interests with managers. 29
Governance reform efforts are mainly the work of lawyers, focusing on
accountability as the objective. Economists, as a whole, have expressed considerable
24. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, enacted in 1977, was an exception to this norm, since this Act prohibited
certain types of payments. However, Part H of the Act, amending Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is
a governance reform measure because it requires that proper books and records be maintained and that corporations install
effective internal control systems.
25. When broad structural reforms were suggested in the early 1900's arising out of monopolization, stiffer antitrust
laws were adopted. See REPORT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMPILATION OP PROPOSALS AND VIEws FOR AND
AGAINST FEDERAL INCORPORATE OR LICNSING OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPILATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL,
STATUTORY, AND CASE LAW CONCERNING CORPORATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR ATIENTION TO PUBLIc UIITy HOLDING
AND OPERATING COMPANIES, S. Doc. No. 92, Part 69-A, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-11 (1934) (discussing hearings and
analyses on federal incorporation questions during the early 1900's which eventuated in the Federal Trade Commission
and Clayton Acts of 1914); G. KoLKo, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, A REINTERPRETATION Of AMERICAN HISTORY
1900-1916, 132-38, 261-67 (5th printing 1967) (discussing Sherman Act revisions and passage of the Federal Trade
Commission and Clayton Act Bills).
26. The most radical idea that has been floated would provide for constituency representation on corporate boards.
See the shareholder proposal submitted to General Motors in 1971, discussed in Schwartz, Towards New Corporate
Goals: Co-Existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57, 60-61 (1971) (but opposed by the author, at 86-88). See also R.
NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 119-28. With the election of a union representative to the board of
Chrysler in 1980, the idea looks less radical. In any event, other reform proponents have not favored it.
27. See Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1981).
28. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION" (Feb. 1983).
29. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL ST. 251, 278 (1977).
But see Fraker, Brawl in the Family at Superior Oil, FORTUNE, May 30, 1983, at 70 (when stockholders sponsored a
resolution, in the face of an entrenched Board and management, that offers to acquire 45% or more of Superior Oil's stock
at above-market prices should be submitted to a committee of three independent directors. The resolution was modeled
after a similar resolution proposed by dissident stockholders at NLT Corp., a Tennessee insurance company. Id. at 73).
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skepticism about the effectiveness and utility of governance reform because they are
more inclined to the notion that market forces, rather than governance forces or
organizational structures, dictate the conduct of corporate managers. 30
What are the goals of those who seek to reform corporate governance? Bayless
Manning has demonstrated that reformers do not speak with one voice. 31 At one end
of the spectrum are reformers who would use governance reform to introduce a new
value scheme into the corporation or society as a whole. These reformers quarrel with
the concept of the corporation as principally a means of maximizing profits through
the efficient production of goods or services. Their reform agenda relates more to
society's overall goals than to traditional corporate and investor objectives. These
reformers are not the mainstream of the reform effort.
The mainstream of corporate reform accepts the corporation as a necessary and
desirable vehicle for achieving economic goals. The reformers' quarrel is with man-
agers, not the corporation. For the most part, lawyer-reformers do not advocate
reform as a means of improving economic efficiency-a subject not within their
expertise and not one that is customarily addressed through law. Their focus is on
accountability, in order to constrain the abuse of power.
Lack of accountability is costly because it deprives the corporation of a dis-
ciplining mechanism over managers, which may result in a divergence of the goals of
managers and the corporation (together with its shareholders). Again, economists
might perceive some gain, in some circumstances, in leaving unreigned the en-
trepeneurial spirit of managers, subject to control by market constraints. One effect of
the lack of accountability may be that the corporation will be less efficiently managed
as managers grow complacent and slothful in their performance because they can
thwart change and turnover and frustrate the operation of the market for control.
Resources between managers and shareholders may be misallocated. 32 Insufficient
regard may be paid to social responsibilities and the welfare of other constituencies of
the corporation because managers may pay too much attention to short term prof-
itability at the expense of long-term goals. 33 Economists refer to management in-
efficiency attributable to a lack of accountability as agency costs, although most
economists do not prescribe governance reform as the means of dealing with the
problem. 34
These potential malfunctions are not necessarily prevalent among corporations
but are more likely to breed in the absence of an accountability discipline and
structure. The goal of most reformers is to reduce that likelihood. This goal is
common to mainstream reformers; the particular emphases will vary.
Reform is often equated with federalism, meaning an increase in the power of
30, Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982).
31. Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS 9 (D.
DeMott ed. 1980).
32. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978).
33. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRuCTUREs. RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
§ 2.01 comment e, illustration 6 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALl PROTECT].
34. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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the federal government. Reformers believe that changes that may be necessary in
corporate governance or corporate law cannot be achieved at the state level and must
be accomplished by federal legislation. Today's reformers hold this view in common
with their predecessors. Whether reform in corporate governance or corporate law is
more effective at the federal level than at the state level is more properly an open
question than a foregone conclusion. Both federal law and state law have shaped the
governance of the corporation, although state law has been the main source. The
existing allocation of roles now must be examined, along with the legal and policy
issues that would allocate more of that power to the federal government.
II. PREVAILING LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The prevailing arrangement for the governance of corporations dates from a
decision made in Philadelphia at the Constitutional Convention. The founding fathers
rejected James Madison's suggestions for a national law of corporations and con-
sequently, Article I of the Constitution contains no reference to corporation law.
35
The power to govern the internal affairs of corporations belongs to the states.
Any state may create corporations pursuant to its general corporation law. Per-
sons seeking to incorporate a business may select any state as the legal birthplace, and
the corporation may then conduct business in all other states. Chaos does not reign
because the act of incorporation in one state is accorded full faith and credit by all
other states under Article IV of the Constitution. Since large corporations roam the
land, it is necessary to determine a fixed point by which their governance arrange-
ments will be judged. That is the role of the conflict of laws principle known as the
Internal Affairs Rule.36 Under the Internal Affairs Rule, which is recognized uni-
versally, the law of the state of incorporation applies to determine the validity of the
internal arrangements of the corporation. 37 This rule extends to the corporate gov-
ernance structure and to determinations of fiduciary duties as well. 38
The principle of the Internal Affairs Rule is strong. Several years ago, the
Supreme Court struck down the Delaware sequestration statute, which permitted
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident director of a Delaware corporation by
attachment of his stock in a Delaware corporation. 3 9 The case was a stockholder
derivative suit concerning a Delaware corporation that did little business in that state
and whose principal office was in Arizona. The issue concerned the fiduciary duty of
managers. The Court struck down Delaware's jurisdiction, which had been obtained
through the attachment and sequestration process, and observed, among other things,
that Delaware simply had "nothing to do" with the case.4 ° Nonetheless, the Court
35. J. MADISON, supra note 18; see also Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REv. 159
(1937); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 125-26 (1972).
36. See REsTATEMNiENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTs OF LAws § 302 comment a (1971).
37. See Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and
Credit, 58 COLUMI. L  REv. 1118 (1958).
38. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
39. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
40. Id. at 216.
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held that Delaware substantive law would apply to the controversy, wherever the case
was heard.4 Thus, the reach of Delaware extended well beyond its borders,
notwithstanding its lack of interest in the case.
Occasional exceptions to the Internal Affairs Rule have been created by statute.
The most important is section 2115 of the California Corporation Code, which em-
ploys a formula to determine the applicability of some of the internal affairs rules of
California, notwithstanding incorporation elsewhere.42 The formula employs prop-
erty, payroll, and sales factors to determine whether fifty percent or more of the
corporation's activity is attributable to California, and requires that more than half of
the voting stock be held by holders of record with California addresses.43
Despite some early holdings adverse to the broad reach of the statute,44 it
appears to pass constitutional muster.45 The statute is consistent with an earlier,
well-known California decision applying the California securities law to an attempt
by a Delaware corporation to eliminate cumulative voting by compliance only with
the Delaware statute.46 While this type of transaction clearly comes within the scope
of the internal affairs rule, the California statute required compliance with its law as
well.
New York, in sections 1317-20 of the Business Corporation Law, also applies
some of its internal governance provisions to certain foreign corporations doing
business in New York, but this statute's reach is not as broad as California's
statute's. 47 However, both the New York and California statutes rarely apply to other
than a closely held corporation. It is the unusual publicly held corporation that meets
the composite fifty percent tests of the California statute, and New York exempts
corporations whose shares are listed on a securities exchange or when less than half
the corporation's business in the last three years is attributable to New York. New
York and California, in effect, apply local law to local corporations and have scant
impact on the affairs of the larger corporations where more of the public interest in
corporate governance lies.
One state, Delaware, has emerged as the leading state for the incorporation of
larger corporations. Once its lead was clearly established, approximately seventy
years ago, its continued leadership was virtually assured.48 As the leading corporate
jurisdiction, far more decisions interpreting and clarifying Delaware law have been
rendered than with respect to any other state corporation law, and the growth rate of
case law has increased exponentially, thus providing predictability in the application
of the Delaware statute. 49 The Delaware bench and bar have gained experience in the
41. Id.
42. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2115 (West 1984).
43. Id.
44. Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C192091 (Super. Ct. Cal. Aug. 5, 1977) (order denying declaratory
relief), April 25, 1978 (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Arden-Mayfair Corp. v. Louart Corp., 385 A.2d 3 (Del.
Ch. 1978)(Delaware action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over Louart).
45. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982).
46. Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rpr. 719 (1961).
47. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1317-20 (McKinney 1982).
48. See Seligman, A Brief History ofDelaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, I DEL. J. CoRP. L. 249 (1976).
49. H. HENN & 3. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 185-86 (3d ed. 1983); Garrett, The Limited Role of
Corporation Statutes, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 12, at 95.
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interpretation of the statute, and the legislature understood the importance to Dela-
ware of maintaining its leadership in this field.50 Consequently, the statute has been
kept up to date, and it has responded to criticisms and advances made in other
states. 5 ' Thus, an understanding of the law affecting corporate governance of large
corporations begins with an understanding of the Delaware statute.
Delaware law now provides that the business and affairs of the corporation shall
be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.1 2 For large corpora-
tions, this means that the board's role is not to perform day-to-day managerial
functions, although it is not affirmatively clear what it does mean. In all likelihood,
the Delaware provision accords with the Business Judgment Doctrine, which recog-
nizes the managerial responsibility of senior executives, the group known as manage-
ment, a term not given any formal recognition in the corporate statutes of Delaware or
any other jurisdiction.5 3
Delaware accords a minor role to shareholders. Of course, they elect directors
annually,5 4 and shareholders are free to nominate candidates for director,55 but the
all-important proxy statement, which is used to solicit the votes of widely scattered
shareholders, is controlled by the board of directors with only minor access allowed
to the shareholders.5 6 Certain transactions require shareholder approval after the
board has approved them, including such matters as amendments to the certificate of
incorporation, 7 mergers or consolidations, 8 sales of assets, 9 or dissolution.60
However, shareholders cannot initiate any of these transactions. The shareholders
also have the power to amend the by-laws, 6 1 potentially a sleeping-giant power,
because by-laws can be amended without approval of the board of directors and if
enough shareholders agree, even without convening a meeting. 62 Moreover, the
statute does not limit what provisions may be included in the by-laws.
Delaware, like all other states, permits shareholders to vote by proxy, 63 but
neither statutes nor rules govern the procedure for solicitation of proxies. Judicial
interpretation requires that the proxies not be misleading.64
50. Between the years of 1899 and 1974, corporate revenues represented 5.2 (in 1960) to as much as 42.5 (in 1929)
percent of Delaware's total state revenues in any one year. See R. NADER, M. GREN, & J. SELIGMAN, CON-
STITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIArr CoRORATIoNs 535-37 app.
(1976). In 1974, 251 of the largest 500 (50.2%) and 448 of the largest 1000 (44.8%) U.S. industrial corporations were
chartered in Delaware. Id. at 502.
51. E.g., DEsL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1982) (enacted July 7, 1977, by the Delaware General Assembly,
just 13 days after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)); see Ratner &
Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 641, 644
(1979).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983); see also MODEL BusINEss CORP. Act § 35 (1979).
53. See, A.L.I. PROCr, supra note 33, § 3.01 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
54. DE. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1983).
55. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. Rev. 1489, 1505 (1970).
56. Id. at 1502.
57. DEs.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1983).
58. Id. § 251(c).
59. Id. § 271(a).
60. Id. § 275.
61. Id. § 109.
62. Id. § 228.
63. Id. § 212.
64. Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
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Delaware courts have recognized that, notwithstanding the absence of formal
statutory procedures as to the scheduling of meetings and the use of the proxy
machinery, management may not abuse the corporate machinery to manipulate the
timing of meetings 65 or the meeting process 66 to perpetuate their own control. The
corporate machinery is not management's own tinker toy, but is exercised subject to
equitable principles.
No rules prescribe the composition or organization of the board of directors,
except as may be provided in the certificate of incorporation. Delaware permits, but
does not require, cumulative voting67 for the election of directors and staggered
terms68 for members of the board of directors. Committees with broad powers are
sanctioned, but not mandated.
69
Delaware allows informality in the manner in which both directors and
shareholders act. Telephone board meetings are permitted, although some collegial
action is required.7" A majority of shareholders may act without a meeting, 7 1 a
provision that is useful for majority-owned subsidiary corporations.72
Delaware adopted relatively modest antitakeover provisions at a time when
many states provided strong defenses against an unfriendly takeover. 73 The con-
stitutionality of the Delaware provision remains doubtful, however, in light of recent
decisions.
74
Delaware imposes fewer impediments to stockholder derivative suits than many
states.7 5 While this policy may appear to encourage litigation against management
and directors, the main effect of the policy is to encourage litigation to be conducted
in Delaware before a forum familiar with corporate cases and where the law is better
defined than in other states. Delaware corporate counsel can more accurately forecast
the outcome. While defendants may not relish stockholder litigation, they prefer a
Delaware forum when the inevitable suit commences. Two corollary points should be
noted: Delaware provides relatively favorable indemnification provisions, 76 and the
65. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). A more tolerant view of management's freedom
to maneuver was taken in Mansdorf v. Unexcelled, Inc. 28 A.D.2d 44, 281 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967).
66. Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980); see Coalition to Advocate Publ. Util.
Responsibility Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Minn. 1973).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1983).
68. Id. § 141(d).
69. Id. § 141(c). The powers of the executive committee, however, are specifically limited by the statute.
70. Id. § 141(i). At common law the requirements for directors' meetings were far tighter. See Baldwin v. Canfield,
26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879).
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1983).
72. Martin Marietta, a Maryland corporation, hoped to gain control of Bendix Corp., a Delaware corporation, by
taking stockholder action immediately following the acquisition of 50% of the Bendix stock. If successful, it could remove
the existing board of directors without cause and replace the directors with their own designees. Bendix, meanwhile,
would have to await the minimum ten day period mandated by Maryland law before asserting its control over Martin
Marietta, since Maryland law does not permit action without a meeting by only a majority of shares. Although the issue
was not finally resolved by the Delaware Supreme Court, Martin Marietta's strategy was held by the Delaware Court of
Chancery to run afoul of section 160 which prevents a more than majority owned subsidiary from voting the shares of its
parent. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., Civ. Action No. 6942, (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1982). Bendix at the time
owned approximately 70% of the stock of Martin Marietta.
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983).
74. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1983). No security for expenses is required, unlike, for example, New York.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
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business judgment rule, the meaning of which lawyers could debate inconclusively
for days, probably has received more interpretations in Delaware than in the remain-
ing states combined."
While some state laws differ in minor respects from the pattern of Delaware law,
the substantive provisions of Delaware law prevail throughout the land.7 8 California
requires cumulative voting79 and provides for extraterritorial application of its
statute. 80 In most respects, however, despite their more regulatory tone, the Califor-
nia statutes differ only moderately from Delaware's in their corporate governance
provisions. Connecticut amended its corporate statute several years ago to require
corporations to have an audit committee of the board of directors composed of three
outside directors."i No other state has followed suit.
Corporations whose shares are listed on the New York or American Stock
Exchanges also must comply with certain provisions of the listing agreement with the
Exchange under which their shares are listed. The Exchanges have broadened the
power of shareholders to participate in certain transactions and require shareholder
approval for the issuance of shares that would dilute the existing voting power by
18 percent. 82 The New York Stock Exchange requires an audit committee com-
posed primarily of independent members. 83 The New York Stock Exchange also
requires a certain number of outside directors on the board. 84 Certain transactions that
have the effect of a change in control also must be approved by shareholders. 8 5 The
thrust of the Exchange rules is to constrain management's power to engage in self
dealings in certain specific respects. The stock exchanges are regulated, to an extent,
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and they are not completely free to
amend their rules, 86 as will be discussed in section III of this Article.
Four major defects may be identified in the prevailing law of corporate gov-
ernance. First, state corporation statutes lack focus.8 7 Perhaps it is implicit that
management must single-mindedly keep its eye on the shareholder interest, but cases
have allowed enough slack in that rule to create substantial doubt. 88 At the same time,
no governing principle has replaced the notion of profit maximization. 89 Probably
77. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsrRA L. REv. 93 (1979); Veasey & Manning, Codified
Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef: An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980).
78. Competitive conditions compel states to copy the leader. For example, when Michigan adopted a new corpom-
tions law in 1972, its principal sponsor boasted that the law would "out-Delaware Delaware." Downs, Michigan to Have
a New Corporations Law?, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 913, 914 (1972).
79. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West Supp. 1984).
80. Id. § 2115.
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-318(b) (West Supp. 1984).
82. N.Y.S.E. LIsTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00 (1983); AMEX COMPANY GUIDE §§ 712-713. The American
Stock Exchange speaks of 20%, but unpublished interpretations have commonly read this to mean approximately 18 %.
83. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 312.00
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(1), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 785(b)(1), (c) (1982).
87. J. W. HursT, THE LEOMMACY OF THE Busut, s CORPORATION 162--64 (1970); B. MANNINO, Discussion and
Comments on Papers by Professor Demsetz and Professor Benston in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATIONS OF
CORPORATE SEcutmEs 81 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus.
LAw. 1125, 1138, 1141 (1976).
88. Schlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
89. A.L.I. PRojECT, supra note 33, at § 2.01.
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corporate managers think that their role is to balance different interests, and they seek
to do this. 90 It is possible, although not easy, for the law to provide some guidance in
this respect, but state law, certainly state statutes, does very little.
Second, the prevailing legal system lacks an adequate internal mode of
accountability. Shareholders cannot do this effectively, and statutes do not con-
template otherwise. The law addresses neither the composition nor the function of the
board of directors. Until fairly recently, all statutes described the board's function as
managing the business and affairs of the corporation, but this description was almost
totally fictional as applied to large corporations. 9' Corporate statutes refer to com-
mittees, but the use of committees, in practice, has overtaken what the statute writers
contemplated. Monitoring has replaced management as a board function, 92 but state
law has rarely recognized that fact nor attempted to deal with the implications of the
change.
Third, the election process is almost totally under the control of management.
The shareholder role is a formal one only, except when a proxy contest is under way.
The uncontested election of directors is almost completely a function of the nominat-
ing process, which, under prevailing law, is within the control of management.
93
Fourth, many problems beset the remedies and enforcement provisions. The
derivative suit is subject to abuse on all sides. A temptation remains to bring strike
suits resulting in lucrative and quick settlements. At the same time, management has
developed the wherewithal to terminate derivative suits on the strength of internal
decisions, which are barely policed under the laws of many jurisdictions. 94 A number
of state statutes impose procedural obstacles to bringing a derivative suit, which may
give management undue protection.95 Finally, even when suits may proceed, the
prospect of redressing a wrong with draconian relief may lead courts to relax the
standards of care and loyalty rather than to impose financial ruin on the defendants.
96
The prospects for changing the state legal structures are slim. State corporation
90. COMMITmE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RFSPONSIBILTES OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (1971).
91. M. MACE, DIRECrORS: MYTH AND REALrrY (1971).
92. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Ac-
countants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375 (1975); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation,
31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976).
93. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1494-1502 (1970).
94. Interestingly, Delaware provides a tougher standard than New York. Compare Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981) (an independent committee of directors may obtain dismissal only where the court determines that the
committee was independent and acted in good faith upon reasonable investigation, and that in the court's independent
business judgment, dismissal is in the corporation's best interest) with Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d
994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (the business judgment rule limits judicial scrutiny of the recommendations of an
independent committee of directors only to their good faith, thoroughness and independence). See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing Zapata with Auerbach and adopting Delaware law). See generally, A.L.I. PROJECt, supra
note 33, at § 7.03 (setting forth circumstances in which corporate law should provide for the termination of derivative
action on the basis of Board or shareholder action).
95. Standing may be conditioned upon owning stock at the time of the wrong in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Din-.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1980); MODEL BUSINESS COR. ACT
§ 49 (1979). Some statutes require that the shareholder post security to cover expenses of the suit. See e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 800(),(d),(e) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CoR'. LAw § 627 (MeKinney Supp. 1982).
96. An example of such an application of the business judgment role may be the dismissal of the action against the
directors of Marshall Field and Co. for thwarting a favorable tender offer. Damages would have exceeded $200 million if
plaintiffs were successful. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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laws compete with the laws of other states because a corporation may incorporate in
one state and do business everywhere. State statutes must be attractive to those who
decide where the corporation will be incorporated. This decision is mainly made by
managers or promoters in consultation with their counsel. A state legislature that
attempts to restrict in any significant way the power of managers or to use state
corporation law as a regulatory device soon finds that corporations will escape the
jurisdiction of that statute and "flee" to another state, all of which may be accom-
plished effortlessly by the stroke of a word processor without moving a single brick or
soul.97 If the reforms in corporate governance do not appeal to corporate managers,
and presumptively the reforms do not appeal to the managers, or else they would have
adopted these reforms voluntarily, then the ability of any one state to impose the
changes is practically nil. 98
In fact, the process of writing and amending most corporate statutes is largely
controlled by the corporate bar. 99 The legislature's role in enacting corporate statutes
is passive, and the usual cross currents of the political process are not significant in
determining the substance of corporate statutes. Corporate statutes are much more a
result of the market process than the political process, but those who possess the
currency in this market are not the only ones affected by the results.
In some areas of law, states have resolved competing interests through the
adoption of uniform laws. The Uniform Commercial Code is perhaps the best illustra-
tion of that process. However, one has no reason to expect the uniform law process to
create a uniform corporation statute that achieves balance among competing interests.
States have no incentive to adopt a uniform corporation law. Those states that
have more permissive statutes have an incentive to maintain their status, and a
uniform law would provide no trade-off benefit for them. State corporation statutes
are unlike the Uniform Commercial Code because corporate managers can painlessly
select the state of incorporation without in any way inconveniencing their method of
doing business. In the absence of uniform commercial laws, commercial transactions
cannot be arranged easily to maximize advantage from different rules of law. The
selection of a state of incorporation can be arbitrary, but the selection of a place of a
commercial transaction is more often based on commercial necessity. In addition, a
state has little incentive not to go along with uniformity in commercial transactions
because the adoption of a more relaxed statute does not hold out the promise of
97. Historian Charles A. Beard once testified before a Senate subcommittee about a local attempt to achieve a
restriction of the power of managers on a state level:
Under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, after he was challenged by Theodore Roosevelt to reform his
own State, the Legislature of New Jersey passed a series of laws doing away with corporate abuses and applying
high standards to corporations. What was the result? The revenues of the State from taxes on corporations fell.
Malefactors moved over into other States. In time the New Jersey Legislature repealed its strict and prudent
legislation, and went back, not quite, but almost to old ways.... It is folly to expect all the States and
Territories to apply strict and uniform principles to corporate legislation; the business of controlling corporations
engaged in interstate commerce belongs to the Government of the United States. That seems to me to be the
lesson we learn from history.
Hearings on S.10 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1937).
98. This is the thrust of what Professor William Cary described as the "race for the bottom," Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALa L.J. 663, 666 (1974), and what Justice Brandeis observed was a
race "not one of diligence but of laxity." Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
99. Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CoNN. BAR J. 409 (1968).
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increased state revenue. Finally, a state's adoption of a lax body of commercial law
could work to the disadvantage of the citizens within that state, resulting in a high
political price. The adoption of a lax corporation statute, which imposes no regula-
tory burdens, is not likely to work to the disadvantage of a small state, few of whose
citizens are likely to be shareholders.
However, the corporate governance system cannot be understood by reference to
state law alone. Federal law plays a role, as shall be examined in the next section.
Even this role does not round out the picture. As is true in many areas of corporate
affairs corporate practice explains as much of the governance system as does corpo-
rate law. Changes have taken place in the prevailing governance scheme of large
corporations as a whole. Most large corporations have boards composed predomi-
nantly of outside directors; most have audit committees, and many have nominating
committees. Directors receive more pay than ever before, and they spend their time
monitoring management. These changes are not universal, however, and actual stan-
dards of practice of independent directors, audit committees, and nominating com-
mittees probably vary considerably. The importance and prevalence of these volun-
tary changes cannot be ignored, even if we cannot yet assess their effectiveness when
not converted into a legal standard with sanctions. The perceived need to provide an
enforceable accountability standard leads us to examine how federal law has sup-
plemented the basic state law governance system.
III. THE FEDERAL OVERLAY ON THE GOVERNANCE SCHEME
The limited power of states to remedy the governance problems has convinced
critics and reformers that federalism and reform are linked. Those who seek reform
think in terms of federal legislation. In fact, a substantial federal overlay on the
prevailing state law system already exists. While no single federal statute deals with
the governance of corporations generally, numerous statutes affect corporate gov-
ernance. In some cases, the statutes deal with particular industries, and in other cases,
the statutes are more generic.
The national banking system contains a number of provisions that relate to the
election of directors and the composition of the board of directors. National banks are
governed primarily by the National Bank Act, 100 but national banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are
subject to other sections of Title 12 and Title 15 as well. These provisions contain
several requirements relating to the governance of national banks.
The National Bank Act requires that the board of directors consist of at least five
members.101 Also, directors are prohibited from participating in the management of
another local financial institution or from being connected with a firm engaged
primarily in securities transactions.' 02 Directors are elected by shareholders, initially
at the shareholders' meeting prior to the opening of business, and subsequently at
100. 12 U.S.C § 21-216d
101. Id. § 71(a).
102. Id. § 78.
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annual meetings.103 Cumulative voting is required,' 0 4 and directors are chosen for
one year terms.
Shareholder approval is required not only for those transactions for which com-
parable requirements exist under state corporation law, but also for changes in capital
structure or reduction of capital10 5 and the decision to levy an assessment on
shareholders if the Comptroller determines that capital stock is impaired. In addition,
transactions affecting capitalization, structure, and mergers also must be approved by
the Comptroller of the Currency. Acquisition by a person or persons acting in concert
who have the power to vote twenty-five percent or more of a class of voting securities
requires prior notice to the Comptroller, subject to certain exemptions relating pri-
marily to prior control.' 0 6 Under certain conditions, a transfer of voting stock through
which a person will acquire ten percent or more of a class of voting stock is rebuttably
presumed to be an acquisition of control.107
Both the Investment Company Act of 1940108 and the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935,109 unlike the other federal securities laws, are avowedly
regulatory. Each subjects the governance scheme of the industries it affects to federal
requirements. The Investment Company Act was enacted following the Investment
Trust Study during the 1930s110 of abuses in the structure of interest companies. The
external management that prevailed in the industry was preserved; that is, the key
management decisions are made not by the board of directors but by another com-
pany, which usually is owned by the promoters of the investment company and that
has contracted to render such services. However, these investment advisory contracts
must be approved by the shareholders for a term of not more than two years and must
be renewed annually by a vote of the board of directors or the shareholders.'l
Shareholders also must have the power to elect directors, 112 to select independent
auditors, 113 to change the investment policy of the company, 1 4 and to approve
distributions of shares by a mutual fund. 115 The independence of directors also is
addressed by the statute, which prohibits more than sixty percent of the board to be
"interested persons." 1 16 The importance of independent directors and the need to
tighten the definition was emphasized by the SEC in a special report in 1966,'
which ultimately produced amendments to the statute in 1970.118
103. Id. § 71.
104. Id. § 61.
105. Id. 88 57, 59.
106. Id. § 5.50(e).
107. Id.
108. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 88 80a-I to 80a--64 (1982).
109. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982).
110. See I L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 147 n.52 (2d ed. 1961).
111. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1982).
112. Id. § 80a-16(a).
113. Id. § 80a-31(a).
114. Id. § 80a-13(a).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l(b)(1) (1983).
116. Id. 88 10(a), 2(a) (19).
117. REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwTH, H.R. REP.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-32, 332-35 (1966).
118. More recently, the SEC outlined options for the elimination of shareholder voting or both shareholder voting
and the board of directors in the management of investment companies, since conditions and problems have changed
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Beyond these structural requirements, investment companies are restricted in
self-dealing transactions." 9 Rather than completely prohibiting conflict of interest
transactions, however, Congress granted the SEC exemptive power, which extends to
the full range of the Act, if the exemption "is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly in-
tended by the policy and provisions of this subchapter."1
20
The Public Utility Holding Company Act also followed a massive federal study
of the problems of the industry, some of which related to the manner of gov-
ernance. 12 1 This Act was the most controversial of the securities laws, and its purpose
was to transform an industry and administer a death sentence to the massive holding
company structures as then existed.' 12  However, not all holding companies were
abolished, and the SEC remained in the business of regulating those that survived.
The regulation is extensive and directly involves the Commission in approving
specific types of business decisions. These include decisions relating to capital
structure, 123 proxy solicitation, 124 accounting practices,' 25 and intracompany
transactions. 126 One commentator notes that the statute grants the SEC power to
condition acquisitions of another company's securities upon the making of a "fair
offer to buy other securitites of that company," ' 127 a federal solution to the sale of
control problem presented in Perlman v. Feldmann.128
The Internal Revenue Code contains countless provisions that have implications
beyond the raising of revenues. One provision intended to affect corporate gov-
ernance is Section 4975(e)(7), 129 which created employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). ESOPs assist corporations in obtaining financing, and, at the same time,
considerably over the past several years. The SEC announced that its goal was reducing the expense of fund operations
without sacrificing investor protections.
The Commission stated it is considering exempting mutual funds from shareholder voting requirements. The
arguments for the exemption are the high cost and apparent apathy of shareholders with respect to shareholder voting. The
arguments opposing the change are the creation of self-perpetuating boards and the loss of the deterrent effect and means
of communication of shareholders connected with the proxy statement.
The Commission also is considering a new type of investment fund with neither voting shareholders nor a board
of directors. The fund would be managed by its sponsor, who would be required to register under the Investment Advisors
Act. Management fee, fund objectives, and other investment features would be set out in the manager's contract. The law
would declare that an investment manager has no fiduciary duty with respect to compensation.
The Unitary Investment Fund (UIF) concept raises the following important issues:
a. whether the SEC should continue its trend of increasing the discretion of independent directors, or resort to
increased regulation;
b. whether 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (shareholders' private right of action) should apply to UIF's, or whether
shareholders should rely on the market mechanism for protection; and
c. whether changes should be made by rules or legislation.
119. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1982).
120. Id. § 80a-6(c).
121. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 110, at 132.
122. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982); see J. SaUoMANr, m TRANssR-At-
"noN oF WALL Srx.r 122 (1982).
123. Public Utility Holding Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79; (1982).
124. Id. § 79k(9), l(e).
125. Id. § 790.
126. Id. § 791(a)-(d), (g).
127. Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935-Fossil or Foil?, 30 V, AD. L. REv. 605, 622 (1977).
128. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
129. I.R.C. § 4975 (d)(3), (e)(7) (1983).
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provide a stock ownership interest for employees. Stock is owned by a trust, and
voting rights are exercised solely by the trustee, but eventually, stock ownership is
vested in the employee. ESOPs have not been widely adopted.130 However, the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 extended the idea and created Tax Credit Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (TRASOPs), 13 1 which give broader voting participation to em-
ployees.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 132 enacted to
protect the rights of employees who participate in private pension plans, has also had
an impact on corporate governance, in a limited way. Pension plans have become
major stockholders of the companies that created them. When a tender offer is made
for the shares of that company, the pension plan may hold the key votes that will
decide the outcome. In deciding how to react to a tender offer, the trustees must
consider the restrictions imposed by ERISA.
An example of the operation of the law occurred in the LTV tender offer for
shares of Grumman. The trustees of the plan were Grumman officers, who hastily
decided not to tender the trust's shares. Instead, the plan purchased additional shares
at a price that was momentarily inflated by the LTV bid and which declined im-
mediately after a preliminary injunction against the offer was issued. In Donovan v.
Bierwirth133 the Second Circuit found that the trustees had violated their duties under
Sections 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA, which require that trustees' decisions
"must be made with an eye single to the interests of the participants."' 134 This
standard of care prescribed by the statute is that of the prudent person. 135
In addition, Sections 406 and 407 of ERISA prohibit trustees from engaging in
certain types of transactions that present inherent conflicts of interest. 136 Although in
Bierworth the court found no violation of these sections by the purchase of additional
Grumman shares, at least one analyst argues that when the trustees of the plan are
officers of the corporation, purchase of employer shares after the announcement of a
tender offer should result in a per se violation.'37
The resolution of this particular technical issue is not the point. The impact of
federal law, even beyond the statute specifically designed to deal with tender offers,
on a profoundly significant structural transaction is the point to observe. Few corpo-
rate transactions affect the governance of the corporation as much as tender offers,
and federal law, from various angles, provides the rules for tender offers.
Many industries are regulated under various statutes and by different regulatory
agencies, and the law that governs those companies often has implications for corpo-
130. The idea originated with Louis Kelso, a lawyer-economist, who sought to create a second source of income and
a capital base for workers. See L. KELSO & P. HE'rrE, Two FACTOR THEORY: TIE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1970); see
also STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF NEw CAPITAL: ESOPs AND OTHER
ALTERNATi ES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
131. I.R.C. § 409A (1983).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982).
133. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
134. Id. at 271.
135. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1) (1982).
136. ERISA 99 406, 407, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1982).
137. Note, The Duties of Employment Benefit Plan Trustees Under ERISA in Hostile Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1692 (1982).
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rate governance. The federal communications law, for example, prohibits foreign
ownership of a television station, and the effect of this prohibition on control transac-
tions, including tender offers, is significant.' 38 A number of other industries are
similarly regulated, and this provides a degree of protection for existing management.
While the antitrust laws are not customarily involved with corporate gov-
ernance, a significant exception is the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Trust Improvements
Act of 1976.139 Acquisition transactions above a threshold amount must be filed with
the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission fifteen or thirty days
prior to their consummation. 140 This time period may be extended by request of the
government, possibly delaying the closing. In tender offers, the delay may be de-
cisive. Mobil Corporation, on two occasions, was prevented from successfully
purchasing shares of Conoco and Marathon Oil Corporation tendered to it in con-
tested tender offers. Since the bidders with whom Mobil was competing were not
subjected to the additional delay and therefore could conclude their purchases, Mo-
bil's higher bid was thwarted by the effect of the law.
From a planning standpoint, Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Trust Improvements Act
plays an important role. 141 The delay that may be occasioned by the law provides
targets with an additional defense and room to maneuver. At the same time, white
knights who come to the rescue of beleaguered targets must structure their bids to
induce shareholders to wait out the prescribed statutory period, which might be
prolonged past that provided in the securities laws.
The most fundamental impact of federal law on corporate governance is through
the basic federal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. It is clear that the purpose of these statutes was not to replace
state corporation law. Federal chartering of corporations was an idea floating around
at the time of the adoption of these statutes, but these Acts were the result of a
conscious decision to enact more limited legislation. 142 While the 1934 Act impacted
upon a number of areas of basic corporate-shareholder relations, such as the periodic
furnishing of information to shareholders, restricting insider trading, and most impor-
tant, regulating the solicitation of proxies, the legislative history indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to supplant state law and did not intend the 1934 Act to be used as
a mechanism for regulating the relationship between management and share-
holders.14 3 Nonetheless, these statutes have had a profound effect on the corporate
governance scheme. SEC interest in corporate governance crested in 1980 with the
publication of the Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, containing a wide range
138. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-311 (1982).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982).
140. Id. § 18a(b)(l).
141. Volk, The Practical Effects of Hart-Scoit-Rodino Premerger Notifications on Tactics in Tender Offers and
Related Transactions, 48 A.B.A. ANTTrRusT L.J. 1459 (1979).
142. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 87.
143. THE CONFERENCE REPORTTO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1934), contains the following passage:
The House bill does not contain a provision corresponding to that contained in subsection (d) of section 13 of the
Senate amendment providing that "nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to
interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer." This provision is omitted from the substitute as
unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in this respect.
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of proposals including such matters as board functions and composition, shareholder
communications, and institutional investor voting practices.
For the most part, however, the securities laws have addressed specific problems
rather than corporate governance as a whole. Since shareholder voting power had
been rendered largely impotent by 1934, one purpose of the 1934 Act was to strength-
en the shareholder position and provide for "fair corporate suffrage."4 The legisla-
tive history shows that Congress was concerned about management domination of the
shareholders' meeting process, whereby proxies were solicited for the automatic
reelection of management-selected directors.' 45 Rather than enacting detailed regula-
tion to control this area, Congress authorized the SEC to adopt rules, which were
initially promulgated in 1935 and which have been amended with regularity since that
time. 146 1
In effect, the proxy solicitation acts as a surrogate for the shareholder meeting,
since it is physically impossible to convene any more than a small percentage of the
shareholders.147 As a result, practically all of the important regulations affecting
shareholder meetings and communications with shareholders have occurred under the
proxy rules rather than under state law. 148.
The proxy rules contain specific requirements for the content of shareholder
communications. 149 An equally important regulator is rule 14a-9, which prohibits
false or misleading statements in a proxy communication, a prohibition that may be
privately enforced, either in a direct action or a derivative action, by shareholders
who can show that the misleading solicitation caused injury.' 50
In connection with a proxy contest for corporate control, federal rules are of
paramount importance. The time periods that are key to the strategy of a contest are
dictated by the federal proxy rules and not by state law. 15' Moreover, contestants
seek at least tacit approval from the staff of the SEC that their documents are free
from false and misleading statements before documents are disseminated. Thus, the
legal battleground in a proxy contest is either the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion or a federal court that interprets the proxy rules.
Tender offers became a frequently employed alternative to proxy contests in the
mid-1960s. While proxy contests were governed by specific federal rules, no rules
144. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
145. S. Rr'. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
146. Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains the existing regulations, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1 to -102 (1983).
147. A then-SEC commissioner once explained, "I know that the old-fashioned meeting cannot be revived.
Admittedly that is impossible. It is not impossible, however, to utilize the proxy machinery to approximate the conditions
of the old-fashioned meeting." Address of Comm. Robert H. O'Brien before The Conference Board in New York City, at
3 (January 21, 1943), quoted in Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 419, 438 n.88 (1971).
148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 88 211, 212 (1982).
149. Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to -102 (1983).
150. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). However,
courts will not allow plaintiffs to allege a violation of the federal proxy rules by pleading an omission to characterize a
transaction as unfair. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978).
151. See Rule 14a-l1, Schedule 14B, under Regulation 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14(a)-1l, .14(a)-102 (1983).
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covered tender offers, creating a gap in the regulatory scheme. 152 The SEC did not
immediately urge that the gap be filled, but target company managers, under threat of
attack in a tender offer, persuaded Senator Harrison A. Williams, chairman of the
Securities Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee, to initiate action.
Senator Wiliams' first proposed legislation dealing with tender offers in 1965, judg-
ing from the tone of his bill, was clearly antagonistic to the hostile tender offers.
Bidders were described as "raiders" and "pirates. 15 3 At this point, the Commis-
sion decided to study the bill and to achieve more balance. A revised version of the
bill was enacted in 1968. This statute made federal law and the SEC the principal
arenas in which these contests for control were conducted.
The statute purports to be neutral with respect to tender offers, trying neither to
discourage them, nor to tip the balance in favor of one side or the other. 154 Sub-
stantial paper work is required of both contestants, 155 and the documents that are
produced frequently spawn litigation, practically all of which is fruitless and ex-
pensive. The tender offer rules, however, go far beyond requiring disclosure, which
is the customary scope of the federal securities laws. Instead, these rules govern
virtually all of the significant conduct in a tender offer. Federal law dictates the
minimum period of the length of a tender offer' 56 and requires that offers for less than
all the shares be accepted on a pro rata basis, 157 that there be withdrawal rights, 158
that price increases be retroactive, 159 and that the management of the corporation be
obligated to make recommendations to the shareholders whether to accept the bid. 160
Federal law is so pervasive that a number of federal courts have concluded that the
state statutes are preempted by the Williams Act,161 a position that the Supreme Court
came close to supporting. 162 The Court did hold that state law has virtually no place
in the regulation of tender offers because of the commerce clause.'
63
The combined effect of a neutral federal position concerning tender offers and
the virtual exclusion of state law from a role in the tender offer transaction for large
152. "Once something has been identified as a 'gap' there of course remains only one thing to do--fill' it!" R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcURrrsS REGULATION 627 n.9 (5th ed. 1982).
153. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 431; see S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CoNG. REc. 28,257-60 (1965).
154. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
155. See Schedule 13D, 14 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1983).
156. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1983).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1983).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2; 240.14d-9 (1983).
161. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, (7th Cir. 1980) affd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois
Business Takeover Act held pre-empted); Great West. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho
Takeover Statute held preempted by the 1934 Act as amended by the Williams Act); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware takeover statute held unconstitutional).
162. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Court was splintered in at least four directions in MITE.
There were three major issues: whether the case was moot, and hence should be dismissed; assuming the case was not
moot whether the Illinois statute was preempted and void under the supremacy clause; and, assuming the case was not
moot, whether the Illinois statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Four justices (Marshall, Brennan,
Rehnquist and Powell) thought the case was moot. Five (White, Burger, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor) believed that the
statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Three (White, Blackmun and Burger) believed the statute was
preempted. Stevens and Powell had doubts as to preemption. O'Connor, Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist did not address
the preemption issue.
163. Id.
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multistate corporations significantly affects corporate control transactions in a way
that was probably not foreseen by the SEC or Congress. Corporate acquisition trans-
actions require approval by the board of directors under state law. 164 The board can
negotiate transactions in a way that shareholders functionally cannot. Furthermore,
the board can reject totally certain transactions or impose conditions on their accep-
tance with a view to the best interests of the enterprise. This pattern reflects a
conscious corporate governance decision:' 65 to give shareholders a direct role that
totally ignores the board's power would alter the dynamics of the transaction in a
fundamental respect. 166 Shareholders are approached to accept a transaction entirely
on the basis of their individual welfare. The decision they make is not collegial but
completely solitary. Indeed, it is largely a coerced decision.167 A would-be merger
partner whose offer is spurned by the board thus is able to render that rejection
irrelevant by appealing directly to the shareholders. Ownership and control-long
separated as Berle and Means' 68 and Herman 169 have observed-are rejoined. The
wisdom of that alteration of power, recognized by all state statutes and by the
common law, is a big subject-one left for another day.170
Beginning in 1938, and formalized in 1942, the SEC recognized that sharehold-
ers could initiate their own proposals for action at a shareholder meeting and make
use of the proxy statement prepared and circulated by management to solicit
support. 17 1 The result has made the SEC and federal courts arbiters of what con-
ceptually are state law decisions-of what matters are properly within the scope of
shareholder action.' 72 While state law theoretically governs the proper scope of
shareholder actions, or even shareholder recommendations for actions, 73 few state
law decisions have decided these matters. 174 Consequently, the SEC must decide
what state law would provide when management seeks to exclude a proposal from the
proxy statement. In the process, the SEC has created a type of free floating state law
that describes the limits of shareholder participation. This intrusion by the SEC into
the state process is unavoidable and is required by the necessity of interpreting the
164. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983).
165. Corporate control transactions often present conflicts of interest to management contemplating their possible
loss of employment. For outside directors the loss of control presents little or no pecuniary loss, and hence a lesser degree
of conflict, but their objectivity may still be questioned. Courts have not found it easy to move through this minefield. See
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Treadway Co., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
166. Automatic Self-cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
167. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249,
307-09 (1983).
168. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
169. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POwER (1981).
170. The strongest support for this view comes from Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofA Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161(1981). Many economists also are supportive. See
Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FiN. ECON. 5 (1983).
171. Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule. 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 654-56 (1977).
172. An example of the application of this principle is the Commission's decision in Crown Cork & Seal, reported in
a minute of a meeting of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Feb. 28, 1964, reprinted in W. CARY, CORPORATIONS
1576 (unabridged 4th ed. 1969).
173. C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1983); see SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
174. Schulman, Shareholder Cause Proposals: A Technique to Catch the Conscience of the Corporation, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1, 55 (1971).
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SEC's rule allowing shareholder proposals. Moreover, this intrusion may be further
justified since the proxy process has become, in substance, the real meeting. Once
Congress decided that this surrogate process was a federal concern, the important
question of what matters could be considered at the shareholder meeting inevitably
was decided as a matter of federal law.' 7 5
Except for the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Investment Com-
pany Act, 176 the federal securities laws were conceived as disclosure laws and not as
regulatory statutes, but disclosure may have a therapeutic effect and thus, substantive
impact. 177 The Securities and Exchange Commission contemplated an extensive use
of therapeutic disclosure in 1978 when the Commission proposed new rules requiring
the furnishing of detailed information about the composition and function of boards
of directors. 178 Although the Commission's power to intrude so deeply into corporate
governance received strenuous opposition, 179 a modified version of the proposal was
adopted,' 80 which calls for disclosure of governance information, and probably en-
courages the types of boardroom changes that the Commission had theretofore
urged. 181
The combination of disclosure requirements, the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws,182 and the implication of private rights of action1 83 worked to extend
the influence of federal securities law into matters of corporate governance. Manage-
ment, advised by counsel of the need to disclose all material facts, was forced to
structure transactions, particularly self-dealing transactions, so that disclosure of the
material facts would not reveal any unfairness. What were material facts, of course,
was to be decided under federal law. Consequently, planning corporate transactions
became largely an interpretation of the federal disclosure standards.
All this is in keeping with a traditional application of the federal securities laws
with an inevitable side effect on internal corporate affairs. However, some courts
175. There is at least some evidence that state law, as locally interpreted, narrowly views the shareholder right to
initiate matters. In Carter v. Portland General Electric Co., 227 Or. 401, 362 P.2d 766 (1961), the court opposed a
management proposal for a major construction project, noting a probable difference of result if Rule 14a-8 applied. A
more permissive view was taken in Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 110-28.
177. Two contemporary scholars, Professors Frankfurter and Douglas, both expected the disclosure requirements to
have an important effect on corporate conduct. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1323-24
(1934); Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act 11, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 55. The intellectual father of the federal
securities laws, Louis Brandeis, had earlier written an oft quoted passage: "Sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light
the most efficient policeman." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1913).
178. SEC Release No. 34-14970 (July 18, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1978).
179. Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSS-
ROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 136 (D. DeMott, ed. 1980).
180. SEC Release No. 34-15384 (Dec. 6, 1978), 16 SEC Docket No. 6 at 348 (Dec. 12, 1978).
181. Chairman Williams expressed his notions of an ideal board on many occasions. See his address at the
University of California Securities Regulation Institute, January 1980 in 1978 SEC. REo. & L. RE,. (BNA) No. 437, at
A-22 (Jan. 25, 1978). The Commission also voiced its concern about lax performance by outside directors in its Report of
Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homer Corporation Relating to the Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling
Homer Corporation, SEC Release No. 34-11516, 11975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE,. (CCH) 80,219; Report
of Investigation of Outside Directors of National Telephone, SEC Release No. 34-14380 (Jan. 16, 1978), 135 SEC
Docket No. 20 at 1393 (Jan. 31, 1978).
182. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
183. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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went a great deal further and decided that a transaction that was unfair, as a matter of
judicial interpretation, violated the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities law
regardless of disclosure. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 184 a parent corporation sold
property to its partially owned subsidiary without disclosing all the facts of the
transaction to the minority shareholders. State law did not require such disclosure of
course, since the directors of the corporation-all of whom were fully informed-had
full power to authorize the transaction. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found a
violation of the antifraud provisions because of the nature of the transaction, which
was allegedly unfair to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.185
Unfairness as the basis of a federal violation of the antifraud rules catapulted
federal law into primacy in the control of corporate transactions. What constituted
"unfairness" in violation of the federal securities laws was a matter of federal law,
and state law became insignificant in the control of corporate transactions. The
apogee of this movement was Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 186 a going private
transaction involving a Delaware corporation. The transaction was authorized by a
fully informed board of directors in accordance with section 253 of the General
Corporation Law of Delaware, which allowed a parent to merge with its ninety
percent or more owned subsidiary without approval by the shareholders, requiring
only after-the-fact disclosure. 187 Delaware law, at that time (and currently)188 pro-
vided no injunctive remedy against the transaction in favor of the minority share-
holders; their only redress was to exercise their appraisal rights. The Second Circuit
found a violation of federal law because the transaction was allegedly unfair, and
Judge Medina emphasized the point by stressing: "But, lest there be any lingering
doubt on this point, we now hold that in such cases [involving breach of fiduciary
duty], including the one now before us, no allegation or proof of misrepresentation or
nondisclosure is necessary."' 189
The Supreme Court reversed in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 190 with a
strong opinion that also left little doubt that the Court insisted that deception was a
necessary element of an action under rule lOb-5. Regulation of breaches of fiduciary
duty belonged to state law.
The Court was less than fully successful in removing the governance of fiduciary
duties from federal securities law. In the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth,
Circuits, the courts of appeals have permitted a federal claim under rule lOb-5,
notwithstanding full disclosure to a board of directors entrusted with plenary author-
ity under state law to authorize the transaction because of inadequate or no disclosure
to shareholders. 19 ' In all of these cases, the claims of deception arose when
184. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
185. Id. at 218; see Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1973).
186. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
187. Id. at 1288.
188. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
189. 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
190. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
191. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v.
American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 933 (1980); Kidwell ex rel Penfold
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shareholders were dissuaded or lulled into inactivity by voluntary statements or by
complete silence in circumstances in which if the facts had been known, the
shareholders would have sought to enjoin the transaction under state law. This is
either constructive deception or constructive causation, both of which are necessary
elements of a rule lOb-5 claim. This logic appears to dovetail federal and state roles,
each in their respective places, but it actually federalizes the issue of the fairness of
the transaction. The arena for judging management conduct shifts from the state
courts to the federal courts, a result the Supreme Court in Santa Fe192 doubtless
wished to avoid and probably thought it had checked.
In addition to the general antifraud provision, the SEC has paid special attention
to particular transactions that the SEC thought presented problems. Going private
transactions offer the best example. The Commission had looked suspiciously on
these purchases, 193 and finally proposed a rule that required the transaction to be
fair.' 94 Rule 13e-3195 as finally adopted, however, requires the proponent of the
transaction to disclose whether in the proponent's opinion the transaction is fair and
then state reasons for believing so. 196 There may be little more than a gnat's worth of
difference between the two versions in a practical sense. The underlying issue re-
mains one of fairness, and a federal forum is provided to deal with that question.
Rules 13e-1 and 13e-4, which govern repurchases of stock by the target company in
a tender offer once the tender offer has commenced and tender offers by issuers for
their own stock, contain similar patterns of disclosure and substance.
It should be clear that all these transactions-self-dealing transactions involving
securities, going private transactions, issuer tender offers, and target company re-
purchases of stock-have become governed largely by federal law standards under
the guise of a statute that is concerned with disclosure and deception. Plaintiffs must
show that deception was a cause of the injury, so courts have inquired into whether
shareholders could have taken any action to prevent the transaction had they been
fully informed. Some courts have gone further and required that plaintiffs show they
would have actually succeeded in state court on their claim.' 97 This has the ironic
effect of trying the state law issue in federal court. Under the circumstances, the
courts could demur and require the plaintiff to go directly to the state court, since the
controlling issue in the case is one of state law, but nonetheless, federal courts have
tried the case.
v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
The idea of "constructive deception" was discussed in Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule l0b-5
After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1874 (1978). See also Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of
Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980).
192. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
193. SEC Commissioner Sommer had expressed serious misgivings about the fairness of the transactions. Address
by A. Sommer, Jr., Comr. SEC Law Advisory Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, South Bend, Ind., "'Going Private":A
Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010.
194. SEC Release No. 33-5884, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81, 366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1983).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1, -4 (1983).
197. Madison Consultants v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1983); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d (7th Cir. 1977).
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However, the courts have declined to find violations of the proxy rules predi-
cated on the unfairness of a transaction that was fully disclosed to shareholders in a
proxy statement on the theory that the shareholders made an informed decision. 198
Courts have also declined to find deception when the omission in the proxy statement
was characterizing the transaction as unfair, obviously an unrealistic expectation, but
rather an effort by plaintiffs to have the court, as a matter of federal law, decide the
substantive issue. That is precisely what the Supreme Court in Santa Fe1 99 intended
to check.
Probably the most celebrated example of SEC involvement in corporate gov-
ernance occurred during the post Watergate revelations of illegal corporate political
contributions and other illegal or questionable payments abroad. Most of the pay-
ments involved sums of money or affected areas of company business that were not
material relative to the size of the corporation. Self-dealing was rare. The SEC's
jurisdiction over this subject was predicated upon a determination that the corporation
made materially false or misleading statements in its filings with the Commission.
Since the payments did not require shareholder approval, it was not easy to show a
causal connection between the omitted disclosure and the transaction. By and large,
private suits foundered on these obstacles.200 The Commission, seeking injunctions
and ancillary relief, alleged that there were material omissions either in proxy state-
ments or in other reports filed by the issuer.
The Commission harkened back to its 1964 decision in Matter of Franchard
Corp.,20 ' to justify the materiality of these omissions. In Franchard, the chief execu-
tive officer, founder, and guiding force behind the company, had engaged in certain
financial transactions with the company which were not quantitatively significant.
But the Commission found that by omitting disclosure of those transactions, the
company failed to reveal important information about the integrity of man-
agement. 20 2 From this decision, the latter-day Commission could conclude that ille-
gal or unethical conduct, even in the pursuit of corporate goals, provided evidence
about the character of management that investors needed.20 3 Obviously, this rationale
requires limitations. An objective standard is needed to avoid overloading the amount
of information that bears on the integrity of management. 20 4 Not every violation of
the law is germane to the issue of character any more than strict compliance with the
law bespeaks integrity.20 5
198. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
199. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
200. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981). However, if the objection was to the election of directors
without adequate disclosure, even of improper practices, a different result obtains. Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp.,
609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979).
201. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
202. Id. at 169.
203. SEcuRrmas AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS
AND PRAcrcEs, SUBMrrIED TO THE SENATE Comm. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
68 (Comm. Print May 19, 1976).
204. Recently, the Commission has narrowed the scope of disclosure to require more of the standard criteria of
materiality. Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 Bus. LAw. 1413 (1983); Speech by
John M. Fedders before Fed. Reg. of Sec. Comm. of ABA, Nov. 17, 1982, reprinted in 1982 SEc. REo. & L. REP.
(BNA) 2057 (Nov. 26, 1982).
205. For instance, when the Commission adopted some proposed rules requiring only disclosure of material finan-
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The Commission used the various payments scandals as the basis for numerous
actions, which, for the most part, were not tested in court. In practically every case,
the Commission entered into a settlement with the corporation and obtained relief
through a consent order.20 6 Of considerable importance for our inquiry, the relief
granted in many of the cases specifically altered the corporate governance structure.
The SEC wanted assurances that the conduct would not be repeated. The consent
decrees provided for the designation of new directors, the creation of audit and
special litigation committees, and the description of specific functions for those
committees. These settlements gave the Commission an influence in the boardroom
far beyond that allowed under any specific provision in the statutes or rules, or under
any court decisions.
In Franchard, the Commission rejected a staff argument that the board of
directors of the corporation acted improperly in violation of its duty of due care.
Chairman Cary's opinion noted that the question was one of state law and not of
federal securities law. 20 7 However, the activities of the Commission in responding to
the payments cases tended to ignore this limitation, since the complaints and reports
often drew conclusions about the propriety of conduct of outside directors.
The power issues largely may have been put to rest by the adoption of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977.208 The Act also dealt with a related
issue-the proper maintenance of company books and records that had often con-
cealed improper payments- and thereby gave the Commission another powerful tool
to affect corporate governance. 20 9 The failure of internal controls was seen as a major
reason for corporate misconduct. Section 13(b)(2) was added to the 1934 Act to
require accurate accounting and internal control provisions, embellished by rules
adopted by the Commission.21 0 As seen by Daniel L. Goelzer, then executive assis-
tant to the chairman and now the general counsel of the SEC, "the consequence of
adding substantive requirements governing accounting control to the federal secur-
ities laws may significantly augment the degree of federal involvement in the internal
management of public corporations. '"
2 11
Goelzer notes that the efficiency of an internal control system cannot be evalu-
ated without considering organizational structure, the caliber of employees, the
strength of an audit committee, and the effectiveness of internal audit operations. 12
cial effects of corporate compliance with environmental laws in SEC Release No. 33-5386 (April 20, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
12,100 (1973), within their rulemaking authority, they were criticized for not requiring more burdensome reporting for the
benefit of investors and the general public. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689
(1974). Following remand, the Commission held 19 days of public hearings between April 14, 1975 and May 14, 1975,
before announcing its proposals for further rulemaking in SEC Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (1975). Although
the Commission's ultimate conclusion not to adopt its October 14, 1975, rulemaking proposal in SEC Release No. 5704,
41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976) was held to be "arbitrary and capricious" and again remanded by the district court, see
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) (stayed pending outcome on appeal)
the court of appeals reversed and the initial "materiality" standard was upheld.
206. E.g., SEC v. los. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
207. 42 S.E.C. 163, 176-77 (1964).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (1982).
209. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, § 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (1983).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78m-(b)(7) (1982).
211. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-The Federalization of Corporate
Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1979).
212. Id. at 28; see also SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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The Commission agreed with this assessment in adopting rule 13b2-2 when the
Commission stressed that the purpose of the FCPA was to promote integrity in the
management process. 21 3 Unlike the antifraud statutes, these provisions can be en-
forced without a showing of scienter on the part of management.214 Given the broad
scope of the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the Commission can range far and
deep into the internal affairs of corporations.
The creation of audit committees was central to the SEC objective to influence
the control system. Rather than adopt a controversial requirement, the Commission
exerted its influence on the New York Stock Exchange to have it adopt such a rule for
companies listed on the Exchange. This may be seen as regulation by raised eyebrow.
The SEC has the power to compel stock exchanges to adopt rule changes under
section 19(c) of the 1934 Act. 1 5 Whether the SEC had the power to require the
exchanges to adopt rules regarding corporate governance is an open question, but in
any event, the Commission, through a speech by its then chairman, Roderick Hills,
suggested that this was a good idea for the Exchange, and the New York Stock
Exchange responded by adopting such a rule.2 16 As a result, all New York Stock
Exchange listed companies now have audit committees that are essentially in-
dependent.
IV. THE FEDERALISM ISSUES IN REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Federal influence on corporate governance could be enhanced either through
action by Congress, the regulatory agencies, or the courts. The power to act of each
of these instrumentalities of the federal government needs to be examined in order to
assess both whether the existing federal action is valid and whether authority exists to
go further.
No specific constitutional provisions authorize Congress to enact corporate
legislation, but proposals for a general federal corporation law have been advanced
from time to time.2 17 Such legislation probably would be sustained under the com-
merce clause.2 18 If such a law did not attempt to supplant existing state corporation
laws but only impose additional federal requirements on corporations engaged in
interstate commerce to structure their boards of directors in a particular manner, to
have audit and nominating committees, or to follow certain prescribed procedures,
there would appear to be no tenth amendment limitations.2 1 9 In other words, the
proposals contained in the Metzenbaum Bill introduced in 1980220 would seem to
pass constitutional muster.
213. SEC Release No. 34-15570 (Feb. 15, 1979); 16 SEC Docket No. 17 at 1143 (Mar. 6, 1979).
214. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp, 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78s-(c) (1982).
216. Letter from Chairman Roderick M. Hills to William M. Batten, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange, May
11, 1976, reprinted in SENATE COMM. BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEsS., REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES,
Exhibit D (1976) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Chairman Hills].
217. See R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIOMAN, supra note 19, at 65-71.
218. Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 134 (1972).
219. Id.
220. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
1984]
572 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:545
Following another tack, legislation embodying the proposals advanced by the
late Professor William L. Cary in a celebrated law review article in 1974, prescribing
minimum federal fiduciary standards, z2 would appear unobjectionable from a con-
stitutional standpoint. Congressional power would be pegged to particular types of
transactions, such as securities transactions, tender offers, or other control transac-
tions, all of which are presently regulated under the authority of the commerce clause
and impose federal duties on top of existing state law applications. For example,
Congress could elect to assert its authority over tender offer transactions by regulating
the use of "golden parachute" contracts.
2 22
Various forms of this kind of legislation, a limited federal intrusion into the law
of corporation, already exist, as we have noted. Arguably, Congress could enact a
federal corporation law that replaced existing state corporation statutes and totally
federalized corporation law, provided a proper federal nexus existed.223 Provisions
would have to be made to preserve existing rights of persons that were created under
valid state laws, 224 but nonetheless, the congressional power to act is probably
plenary, at least with respect to all those corporations in which Congress is likely to
have any interest. 22
5
Moving from the broadest possible application of federal power to a more
surgical approach, to what extent may federal agencies or courts affect the governing
structure of corporations in narrower ways? Since the SEC is the agency that most
affects corporations as a whole, that agency's rulemaking authority is most relevant.
In particular, the SEC's interest in structural changes in the board of directors merits
the most attention.
The SEC has favored the use of independent directors to resolve a number of
problems. 226 As we observed earlier, that approach is built into the Investment
Company Act. 227 The Commission also has championed special committees of the
board, notably the audit comittee, as a means of assuring compliance with certain
objectives of the federal securities laws.228 The Commission's power to require these
governance changes may be sustained if it is necessarily or properly related to the
SEC's main missions, such as providing full and accurate disclosure, maintaining the
integrity of the market, or exercising supervisory powers over self regulatory
organizations.229
221. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
222. The SEC Advisory Committee on tender offers recommended several changes in federal law to govern areas of
tender offer resistance that are now covered by state law, principally by the business judgment rule. Thus, an "advisory
vote" by shareholders would be required for "golden parachutes." See SEC ADVISORY COMMIrrrE ON TENDER OFFERS,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 41 (July 8, 1983).
223. Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 144 (1972).
224. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
225. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I11 (1942).
226. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. 1974); Note,
Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976).
227. REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. RE'.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 332-34 (1966).
228. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIo STATE L.J. 655, 666-70 (1984).
229. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
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The Commission has never acted by rule to require all corporations subject to its
jurisdiction to create an audit committee. 23 0 However, it has used its influence on the
New York Stock Exchange to have that organization write such a rule, with the result
that most major corporations now have audit committees. Other stock exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers do not compel companies who trade
through their facilities to have such a committee. Moreover, it is not clear that the
SEC's goals for such a committee can be achieved without direct action, requiring us
to examine the Commission's independent power to mandate an audit committee.
The Commission has broad power regarding accounting principles, accounting
books and records, and possibly, auditing standards.23 1 In 1978, the Commission's
then general counsel, Harvey Pitt, expressed the view that these powers enable the
Commission to require the creation of an audit committee in the interest of greater
reliability of financial statements by assuring the independence of auditors and the
strengthening of internal controls. 232 Surely Mr. Pitt had some basis for his opinion
because Congress relied heavily on the requirement for independent auditors rather
than on any role of management as a means of providing integrity in financial
statements. Requiring an audit committee to give added credence to the independence
of auditors seems to be an afterthought. Nevertheless, a mandated audit committee to
implement the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is reason-
ably related to that statutory objective, even if no specific rulemaking by the Com-
mission is mentioned in Section 13(b)(2). 23
Instead of directly requiring an audit committee or any other committee, the
Commission might use its power under Section 19(c) of the 1934 Act 2 34 to compel
stock exchanges to adopt rule changes requiring such committees, designed along
lines the SEC favors. This provision resulted from the 1975 amendments to the
securities laws, dealing largely with market structure and the creation of a national
market system. It has been suggested that the SEC could compel the stock exchanges
to adopt rules relating to corporate governance and not necessarily limited to the audit
committee.235 That idea is disputed, and its suggestion has been greeted with great
hostility236 as well as with gentle but firm rejection.2 37 The reform of corporate
governance was not on Congress' mind when it enacted Section 19(c), and despite the
New York Stock Exchange's long history of some governance involvement, the idea
of compelling the Exchange to play a central role in governance reform is at least a
big stretch.
230. Letter from Chairman Hills, supra note 216.
231. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s-(a) (1982); Securities Act of 1934, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c-(b) (1982); Securites Act of 1934 § 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 15 U.S.C. § 78l-(b)(I)(J)-(L) (1982); Securities Act of 1934,
§ 13(b)(1)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m-(b)(l)(2) (1982).
232. Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the Commission's Authority to Require Public Companies to Establish
Independent Audit Committees (March 2, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 81,535.
233. Goelzer, supra note 211, at 33-34.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 77s-(c) (1982).
235. Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31
Bus. LAw. 863, 1095-96 (comments by Lee Pickard) (1976).
236. Id. at 1096 (comment by Stephen Paradise).
237. Id. at I II (comment by William Cary).
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Both the New York and American Stock Exchanges, on their own initiative,
have adopted many rules relating to corporate governance through the listing agree-
ment with listed companies. The Company Manual of both the New York and
American Stock Exchanges is an important source of de facto law for affected
companies in major respects. Both exchanges require stockholder votes when none
are required under state law.23 The New York Stock Exchange requires at least two
independent directors to comprise a majority of the audit committee, clearly exceed-
ing any requirement under state law.2 39 Both exchanges require the solicitation of
proxies, which is not required under either state law or the SEC's proxy rule.
240
However, all these requirements are self-initiated by the stock exchanges. By
demonstrating that their standards are higher than minimally required by law, the
exchanges develop public confidence in their markets. These requirements, there-
fore, are in part a commercial effort to boost trading on their markets, but the
adoption of rules by the exchanges is limited by competitive factors. Companies now
may secure many of the advantages that were once exclusively available through
listing without listing or complying with exchange standards. The National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) national listing system (NASDAQ) offers many of
the same trading benefits, and the NASD has not gone as far as the major stock
exchanges in imposing governance requirements. The New York and American
Stock Exchanges risk losing business to the NASD if their governance requirements
become too onerous. Since the exchanges' standards are not the result of legal
mandate, they are enforced by the exchanges and not by the SEC and probably do not
give rise to a private enforcement action. 24' Rules that deter listing may be revised or
repealed, subject to the SEC's power to approve rules changes.
The SEC is not necessarily interested in the same competitive considerations
when it decides whether to impose a rule on the stock exchanges, a fact which may
militate against recognizing any such power in the hands of the SEC. The power
question and the implied private remedies question are worthy of major consideration
by themselves and cannot be discussed in detail in this Article.
Judge Henry Friendly found the idea of experimentation by the stock exchange
in corporate governance worthier than legislation or rulemaking and put forth the idea
at an American Law Institute-American Bar Association symposium. 242 Of course,
Judge Friendly's idea does not advance the proposition that the SEC possesses the
power to compel experimentation but rather is only an invitation to the exchanges to
try new ideas.243 Voluntary experiments may be the best means to see which gov-
ernance changes work well, or if at all, but they are unlikely to be tried without SEC
prodding. Given the reasonable relationship of governance reform to overall SEC
238. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00 (1983). AMEX COMPANY GUIDE § 712-13.
239. N.Y.S.E. LIsED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983).
240. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 402.04 (1983 ed.); AMEX COMPANY GUIDE § 705.
241. See Waick v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2118, reh'g
denied, 104 S. Ct. 29 (1983).
242. Friendly, Make Haste Slowly, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 12, at 525.
243. Id.; N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983). The New York Stock Exchange soon thereafter
executed a Legal Advisory Committee whose charter stated that its principal focus was to be on matters relating to
corporate goverance.
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objectives, it is likely that the SEC's power to use its authority over the self-
regulatory organizations to compel internal corporate changes would be recognized.
However, such an idea has merit only if the SEC is willing to allow the exchange to
design the content of the rule and if no private enforcement is allowed under the
securities laws for any rule. Otherwise, the exchanges are mere shills for the SEC and
there is no difference, let alone advantage, in having the exchanges adopt rules.
Consequently, all the SEC should do, if it acts through these means, is to direct the
exchanges to adopt some mandate that addresses the subject matter.
Still another approach that the Commission could employ to influence corporate,
governance is to condition the use of simplified disclosure procedures upon the
installation of certain governance requirements. Thus, the Commission might de-
termine that the use of independent nominating committees or a certain percentage of
unaffiliated directors might be the hallmark of companies that have proper
accountability systems and therefore are eligible for simplified disclosure with less
supervision by the Commission. The use of Forms S-322 or of rule 415245 could be
made to turn on the existence of a board structured in this manner. The SEC would
have to demonstrate that these governance mechanisms are related to the goal of
securities regulation. Although the Commission is empowered to adopt rules for
disclosure that are in the public interest, the SEC may not pursue public policy goals
other than those for which the Commission was created.2 46 Despite this restriction,
the SEC probably has broad latitude to adopt rules along these lines. 247 A convincing
case probably can be made that good management in part depends upon proper
governance structures, and well managed companies require less detailed mandated
disclosure to serve the interest of investors. Even more to the point, companies that
have independent directors, an audit committee, and a nominating committee are
more likely to produce full and fair disclosure and to police the internal disclosure
process.
The Commission's traditional power is disclosure, which generally is used to
assist investors in making informed choices. Proxy disclosure is only partially related
to investment choice; for the most part, disclosure serves shareholders in making
voting decisions, which are more closely related to the governance of the corporation
than to investment decisions. In this function, the Commission may have greater
latitude to use disclosure requirements to encourage conduct, such as the adoption of
particular governance programs, because of the close relationship of disclosure to
promoting meaningful shareholder participation. This process is known as therapeu-
tic disclosure and is arguably one of the original purposes of the Securities Act of
1933.245 In 1978, the Commission proposed disclosure requirements 249 relating to
244. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (193).
245. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1983).
246. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 f1976).
247. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. RLV. 408 (1962).
248. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.Q. 311,
330 (1974)-
249, SEC Release No. 34-14970, 43 red. Reg. 31,945 (1978).
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board structure and board committees. These proposed requirements in part were
designed to promote more independent directors and to establish certain types of
committees. Finally, the Commission retreated in substantial part from the original
proposal, 25 0 although not necessarily from the notion of therapeutic disclosure. 2 1
More recently, SEC officials have suggested that disclosure requirements should
be closely related to traditional investor interests. 252 Qualitative disclosure, which
was at the heart of the Commission's questionable payments or management fraud
program, has been criticized as departing from the traditional goals of securities
regulation. Investors were not interested in the forced revelations. 25 3 Of course, no
one would claim that an incidental therapeutic objective or effect would deny power
to the Commission to adopt a disclosure rule so long as investment or voting informa-
tion was promoted. In actual effect, this gives the SEC broad latitude to adopt rules
that it believes serve the traditional purposes of the securities statutes.
Much of the expansion of the federal securities laws has occurred in the
courts. 25 4 Largely through application and interpretation of the antifraud provisions,
the substantive reach of the federal securities law was extended so that conduct had
only to "touch" a securities transaction to involve rule lOb-5. 25 5 However, most of
this judicial activity resulted in the development of federal fiduciary standards and not
in new rules or standards of corporate governance. As noted earlier, the Commission
itself rejected an opportunity in 1964 to set forth a standard of director conduct, 6
and again in 1974 decided not to proceed with a project to define duties of di-
rectors.25 7 Nonetheless, the Commission has been instrumental in persuading courts
to issue orders that restructured the governance arrangement of many corporations,
mainly as an outgrowth of management fraud cases involving questionable payments.
Practically every case in which courts appointed new directors, created new
committees of the board, designated special counsel, or employed similar governance
techniques was settled, and the restructuring orders were part of a consent decree.25 8
The assumption by most courts that they possessed the power to issue such orders has
rarely been challenged by an opponent who argued and briefed against the relief
granted or questioned by the court itself.25 9
250. SEC Release No. 34-15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), 16 SEC Docket No. 6 at 348 (Dec. 19, 1978).
251. Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS 177, 191
(D. DeMott ed. 1980).
252. See supra note 204.
253. Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAw. 1295 (1976); Mann, Moral
and Ethical Problems; Loans to Management and Compensation Problems, 31 Bus. LAw. 1305 (1976).
254. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1961); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law";
An Assessment. 78 H~av. L. REv. 1146 (1965); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way,
31 Bus. LAW. 991, 1000-1001 (1976).
255. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
256. Matter of Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
257. Corporate Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, Address before the Thirteenth Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute, Northwestern University School of Law; see 1974 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 272, at A-II (Oct. 9,
1974).
258. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MirN. L. REv. 865, 946
(1983).
259. But see SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1978).
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The court's authority must rest on its power to grant ancillary relief to remedy a
violation of law. In general, courts have liberally viewed their equitable power to
administer relief that is appropriate in order to effectuate the policies of the regulatory
statutes at issue. 260 Thus, Professor George Dent writes, "The most persuasive
argument for ancillary relief in federal securities law is that the Supreme Court and
many lower courts have approved such relief and that almost no judicial precedent
has questioned it."
261
Until the mid 1970s, the Supreme Court read the SEC's mission broadly and
indicated few restrictions on ancillary relief. The narrowing of the substantive pro-
visions of federal securities laws beginning with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores262 and continuing with Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 2 6 3 Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Greenz 64 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,265 and Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 2 6 6 checked the development of federal corporation
law. Professor Dent argues that this development portends a similar limitation on the
power of the lower courts to use ancillary relief in ways that carry the impact of the
federal securities law into areas Congress did not intend.
267
The question, then, is whether the courts overreach the congressional intent
when their orders extend into the corporate governance arrangement. When the SEC
and federal courts assert some control over the membership of the board, a conflict,
or at least a potential conflict, with state corporation law is created. Can shareholders
exercise their rights under state law to remove such directors without cause, or with
cause? Can the shareholders simply refuse to reelect them? Can they swamp the
directors by creating many new directorships, or is the size of the board frozen? What
is the effect on cumulative voting or on staggered boards? What happens in a proxy
fight when an insurgent offers a whole new slate? Ancillary power, after all, is only
incidental to some principal policy or objective that is served by the law to which it
adheres.
The legislative history of the federal securities laws demonstrates that Congress
was not interested in adopting a federal law of corporations. 268 The management and
affairs of the corporation were matters for state law, not federal law, and the com-
mittee reports left little doubt that Congress was not seeking to rearrange the internal
affairs of the corporation. 269 Some impact on the internal operations of the corpora-
tion was inevitable, through the effect of the disclosure and proxy soliciting
260. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Farrard, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement
Suits, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1779 (1976).
261. Dent, supra note 258, at 869.
262. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
263. 430 U.S. I (1977).
264. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
265. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
266. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
267. Dent, supra note 258, at 869; see Wolfson, Needed: Statutory Reform to Improve Consent Decree Process, 57
HARV. Bus. Rnv. No. 2 at 18 (March, April 1978).
268. 1 L. Loss, supra note 110, at 902; Dent, supra note 258, at 880, 882, 893; Loomis & Rubman, Corporate
Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 141, 161 (1979).
269. S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934)
(Conference Report).
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regulations,2 ° but it was surely not Congress' intention to prescribe standards for the
composition and operation of the board of directors.
Many courts broadly construed the antifraud provisions of the statutes to reach
"equitable fraud" and to impose federal standards of fiduciary duties. 271 However,
when the issue whether a violation of rule lOb-5 could occur without deception first
was presented to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the lower court and wrote in
no uncertain terms that rule lOb-5 did not cover such conduct. 272 The Court observed
that a private cause of action under the antifraud provisions should not be implied
unless it was necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the legislative purposes of the
statute. The Court said it was reluctant to imply a federal claim, which served "at
best a subsidiary purpose" of the law.
2 7 3
The Court added that another factor militating against recognizing a federal
claim for breach of fiduciary duty was that such a claim dealt with an area "tradi-
tionally relegated to state law."274 The Court foresaw that to deal with a wide variety
of transactions affecting minority shareholders, it would have to bring rule lOb-5 into
areas of corporate conduct that traditionally had been left to state regulation, to create
the danger of vexatious litigation, and to cause overlaps and possible interferences
with state corporate law. "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden. "275
While all this adds up to a powerful argument against the judicial authority to
grant the kind of relief that the SEC has requested in many cases, I think the case for
restricting the courts in the matter of relief has not been made. The issue, after all, is
the power of the court, not the SEC, to impose a remedy; the issue is not whether to
find a violation. It is true that the SEC initiates the request and may play a role in
implementing it, but nonetheless the issue is the power of an equity court after it has
found a violation of the law. It is also too sweeping to generalize that because
Congress did not intend to enact a federal corporation law, Congress renounced all
interest in the functioning of the board as it affected the substantive requirements of
the securities laws. In truth, Congress focused little on the board of directors as a
body separate from management.2 7 6 Governance reform is a relatively new approach
to prevention of managerial misconduct. The scholarly contributions of social scien-
tists and lawyers who study boards of directors and prescribe new functions and
methods were not available to Congress in the 1930s.27 7 Consequently, governance
270. Cary, supra note 98.
271. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbook 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Patrick, Rule lOb-., Equitable Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbook: Another Step in the Continuing Development of
Federal Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457 (1969).
272. Patrick, supra note 271, at 478.
273. Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 479.
276. Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 179.
277. A considerable library of literature dealing with organizational theory and relating it to board of directors has
been amassed. A sampling includes: R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY O THE FIRM (1963); R. LIKERT,
THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION (1967); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPoRAr
CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1970); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). Some of the more
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reform in those pathological situations in which a court has found a violation is not a
subterfuge to enable the federal government to get a foot in the federal corporation
law door but is a surgical approach to an identified problem.
Additionally, in a broad sense, it is reasonable to think of corporate governance
reform as closely related to the disclosure and suffrage objectives of the federal
securities laws. The responsibilities of those laws are met by persons within the
company, and increasingly, boards and their committees play a role in providing
disclosure, reacting to tender offers, and making decisions in a number of areas
within the scope of the federal securities laws. Certainly corporate governance struc-
ture is related to the goals of assuring proper internal controls as mandated by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The great strength of equity courts has been their ability to react in creative ways
to individual situations. The Supreme Court's cautions not to engage in judicial
legislation or to invade state substantive corporation law should not be read so
extremely to deny equity courts their traditional powers. Certainly it is far too sweep-
ing to conclude that restrictions on implied private rights portend a limitation on relief
available when a public action is brought by the enforcing agency. No such reading is
fair from any decision by the Court.
In addition to issuing orders that directly affect corporate governance, courts
make general rules that may indirectly but profoundly affect the governance structure
or process. To use a recent landmark state court decision as an illustration, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP27 8 noted that fairness was, in part, a
function of process.279 The court observed that the transaction between the parent
corporation and its subsidiary might have been accomplished by the creation of a
special committee designated by the parent to carry out the negotiations with the
subsidiary's management. 280 The court stopped short of requiring that procedure.
Conceivably, a federal court might determine that a transaction, to pass federal
standards of fairness, might require such a procedure. A federal court also might
determine that the dismissal of a stockholder's derivative suit upon motion of the
board of directors may be accomplished only if the board of directors is composed of
independent directors and has followed certain procedures.
The limits on the federal courts' power to make such rules is constrained by
Santa Fe281 and by Burks v. Lasker.282 The inapplicability of federal law to alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty in general has been discussed. Of course, in cases arising
under section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, courts may apply a
federally enacted fiduciary standard.283 Conceivably, going private and issuer tender
important legal academic contributions include: Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); Conard, A Behavorial Analysis of
Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895; Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science
and Corporate Law, 80 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1981).
278, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
279. Id. at 711.
280. Id. at 709 n.7.
281. 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977).
282. 441 U.S. 471 (1977).
283. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1982).
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offer transactions, which are the subject of federal rules,28 4 may be governed by
federal standards, although serious doubt about the applicability of federal law in
these areas is expressed in Santa Fe.2 85 Thus, federal courts have a limited opportu-
nity, interpreting federal law, to render the type of substantive decision that leads to
new governance rules.
The federal courts follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in many aspects
of derivative suits, 286 but the Supreme Court in Burks2 87 limited the federal role in
deciding whether the board of directors could terminate the suit. Consequently, there
is little opportunity to prescribe federal governance standards for the exercise of that
power.
Burks was a derivative suit by shareholders of a mutual fund against several
directors of the fund and its investment adviser. 288 Plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as well as common law breach of the duty of due
care, centering around the fund's substantial purchases of Penn Central commercial
paper just prior to Penn Central's insolvency. The complaint did not allege any
self-dealing on the part of the defendants but rather charged that defendants had failed
to exercise due care in relying almost exclusively upon the advice of a third party
brokerage firm. 289 Five members of the eleven-person board, who were not affiliated
with the fund's investment adviser and were not defendants in the suit, convened as a
quorum pursuant to the company's by-laws, retained a retired chief judge of the New
York Court of Appeals as independent counsel, and on the basis of their investiga-
tion, decided that the litigation was adverse to the company's best interest and moved
to dismiss. After permitting discovery on the question of the directors' independence,
the district court granted the motion. 290 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.29 1
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit. 292 First, the Supreme Court
held that state law governed the question whether disinterested directors possessed
the power to terminate a derivative suit if they concluded that the litigation was
adverse to the corporation's best interest. Second, the Court acknowledged that even
if state law permitted such a decision under some circumstances, such a state policy
might be inconsistent with a federal policy underlying the cause of action. The Court
declined to find any conflict between the federal statutes involved in the case and the
board action.293
Since Burks, few federal courts have found federal policies to be a basis for
denying an effort to terminate the derivative suit. In Galef v. Alexander,294 the
284. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, -4 (1983).
285. 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977).
286. FED. R. Clv. P. 23. 1.
287. 441 U.S. 471 (1977).
288. Id. at 473.
289. Id.
290. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
291. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1982).
292. 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1977).
293. Id.
294. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Second Circuit found that a derivative suit would frustrate the policy underlying the
proxy rules, but most federal courts have employed the internal affairs rule under
state law.295
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in rule 23.1, require that demand be made
upon the board of directors prior to the institution of a derivative suit, unless such
demand is futile, and that demand be made upon shareholders "if necessary. ' '296
Most state laws have similar requirements.2 97 The issue of the futility of the demand
on directors is a federal question, 298 even in diversity cases, while the necessity of the
demand on shareholders in non-federal cases turns on state law. 2 9 9 The determination
of when a demand is required of directors usually turns upon whether the court
believes that the board of directors is composed of persons who are capable of making
a judgment in the interest of the corporation. 300 Thus, it would seem open to federal
courts to decide by whatever standard they regard as appropriate whether a board
possesses the necessary independence to make demand necessary. Courts could look
to the process by which directors are nominated and against whom the suit is brought
to decide the question. The existence of such standards could have a significant
impact on the composition and selection process of boards of directors of corpora-
tions that are large enough to contemplate derivative suits brought in federal court.3 '
Finally, a federalism question that examines not the power of the federal govern-
ment but rather the limitations of state law, concerns the extent to which federal
regulation in certain corporate regulatory areas preempts state regulation. This issue
recently has been presented in the tender offer area. By 1982, approximately thirty-
five state laws superimposed state regulation onto the federal regulation of tender
offers, 302 but most of those laws probably were invalidated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.30 3 The state laws failed by virtue of the commerce
clause, and the Supreme Court did not rule upon the preemption issue. 30 4 However,
new enactments by some states, which may satisfy the commerce clause test, once
again compel consideration of the preemption issue, and the Court may have to
decide whether the Williams Act preempts state tender offer statutes of the type
295. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
296. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
297. E.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (Michie Supp. 1983).
298. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not controlled by
Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
299. Brooks v. Land Drilling Co., 564 F.Supp 1518, 1522 (D. Colo. 1983). Compare Rosengarten v. Buckley, 565
F.Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1982) vith Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964).
300. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1982).
301. Thus, § 7.03(b) of the ALI Project requires action of members of a board who qualify as independent directors
in order to terminate a derivative action brought against corporate fiduciaries. Tent. Draft No. 2 is expected to make
numerous changes when itappears in 1984 but the substance of the earlier draft remains the same. A more restrictive view
on the board's power to terminate derivative litigation was stated in Coffee and Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981). Professor Coffee is the
reporter for Part VII of the ALl Project, and Professor Schwartz is a consultant.
302, SEC Release No. 33-6158, n.14 (Nov. 29, 1979); 18 SEC Docket No. 17 at 1053 (Dec. 11, 1979).
303. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Subsequent decisions by lower courts struck down state tender offer statutes on the same
reasoning as MITE. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,
697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines
v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
304. See supra note 162.
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adopted by Ohio3°5 and Maryland. 316 1 think a strong case can be made for federal
preemption of the entire field on tender offer regulation. The federal design is not
intended to thwart or encourage tender offers, unlike the state statutes, which are
structured to impede tender offers, but this area is primarily one of corporate law
rather than governance and beyond our present scope.
V. THE ALI PROJECT AND FEDERALISM
In the previous section, we discussed the federalism-corporate governance issue
in terms of powers and limitations. The American Law Institute (ALI) is in the midst
of a project that studies corporate governance from the standpoint of public policy.30 7
That project and its relationship to federalism requires comment at this point.
The corporate governance project marks the first foray by the American Law
Institute into traditional corporate law.30 8 The ALI embarked upon it shortly after
adopting the Federal Securities Code, which was a proposal for a statutory overhaul
of all of the federal securities laws.30 9 Neither corporate governance nor corporate
law was a main focus of the Federal Securities Code.
Earlier efforts by the American Law Institute to deal with corporate law were
never launched partly because of the ALI's difficulty in dealing with a subject matter
that was so largely statutory. 310 However, in 1977 and 1978, the American Law
Institute and the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the American
Bar Association conducted an exploration of corporate governance. 3 1' A series of
regional invitational meetings were held at a time when the SEC3 12 and Congress3 13
were studying the subject and reform proposals were being floated. 3 14 Among other
things, the meetings questioned whether any new federal legislation was appropriate.
A consensus developed from the regional meetings that the American Law
Institute should undertake a project to deal with corporate governance. 3 ' 5 The form of
this project was unclear since little in the way of typical restating was contemplated
and perhaps was best stated by Professor Loss who described the undertaking as "a
new art form."-316 The project finally was approved by the Council and was funded
305. OHIO H.B. No. 822 (Nov. 18, 1982), codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(2)(1), 1701.48,
1701.831, 1707.42 (Page Supp. 1983).
306. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 603, 8-301(14) (Supp. 1983).
307. Wechsler, Foreword of A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 33, at vii.
308. Wechsler, Welcome on Behalf of the American Law Institute, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 12, at 17.
309. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980).
310. Wechsler, supra note 308.
311. COMMENTARIES, supra note 12.
312. SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 2D. SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 29 (Comm. Print Sept. 4, 1980).
313. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); Protection of Shareholders Act of 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Securities of Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
314. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 19; American Bar Association, Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978);
Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly-owned
Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978).
315. COMMENTARIES, supra note 12, at 7.
316. COMMENTARIES, supra note 12, at 280.
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and staffed under the direction of Stanley A. Kaplan, a former law professor from the
University of Chicago, and Harvey Goldschmid, a professor at Columbia Law
School, as Deputy Chief Reporter. The other reporters initially appointed were Pro-
fessor Melvin Aron Eisenberg of the University of California Law School, Professor
John C. Coffee, at that time a professor of law at Georgetown and later a professor of
law at Columbia, and Professor Ernest L. Folk, III of the University of Virginia Law
School. Professor Folk later withdrew and Marshall Small, a San Francisco attorney,
was designated as a reporter.
The "art form" still is emerging, 317 but the project now is organized into five
main parts. One part attempts to prescribe a governance structure for corporations. As
set forth in the first published draft, 318 the largest publicly held companies were
required to have a board composed mainly of independent directors, one of whose
main functions was to monitor senior management. Both audit and nominating com-
mittees were mandated. As more recently modified by the Council, only an audit
committee remains mandated. All of these proposals are recommended, however, for
publicly-issued companies.
The second part of the project deals with the duty of due care and the Business
Judgment Rule. 31 9 The third part spells out the duties of loyalty of directors, officers,
and controlling shareholders of corporations, the area historically labelled as fiduci-
ary duties. 320 Following that, the fourth part will deal with areas of corporate con-
trol. 321 Finally, the project describes enforcement and remedies.32 2
Some portions of the project constitute traditional ALL restatement because they
codify and systematize existing judge-made law. This is done mainly in the area of
duties of due care and loyalty. The portions dealing with enforcement are partly
traditional restatement but also contain proposals for change, which may be achieved
either by courts choosing to follow them or by legislatures choosing to enact them.
The corporate governance structure material, insofar as it mandates changes, is de-
pendent on legislation, although not necessarily federal legislation. Moreover, those
portions of the project that identify proper or preferable corporate practice might be
picked up by courts as a standard to be applied in particular cases, while at the same
time permitting necessary flexibility. 3
23
While action by the American Law Institute is not official action and certainly is
not action by any federal body, the American Law Institute is a national body. Its
actions and recommendations, representing a broad consensus of distinguished law-
317. The ALl project does not fit within the customary ALl restatement mode; in fact, Tent. Draft No. 2 will be
called "Analysis and Recommendations" instead of "Restatement and Recommendations." Many sections begin either
with the words "Corporate Law should provide" which is sometimes a statement of present law and other times a
recommendation for change. This appears as black letter. Some sections begin with the phrase "It is recommended as a
matter of corporate practice that .... These sections will not appear in black letter, to emphasize their non-mandatory
character.
318. A.L.I. PRoJEcT, supra note 33, Part InI.
319. Id., Part IV.
320. Id., forthcoming as Part V in Tent. Draft No. 3.
321. Id., forthcoming in a future tentative draft as Part VI. This will not appear before 1985.
322. Id., Part VII.
323. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); Mundheim, A Time to Learn, in CoMMENTrARisS, supra note
12, at 181.
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yers, scholars, and judges from the entire country, have an effect on courts and
legislatures throughout the country. Action by the ALI then may be a prelude for
official governmental action.
The implementation by states of proposals adopted by the American Law In-
stitute would be a form of functional federalism in that the proposals represent
generally adopted solutions to national problems.
The opponents of the ALI project apparently perceive the significance just
described, judging from the vigor of their efforts. Business groups and interested
ABA committees have complained about a lack of communication and participation.
The change in the political climate since 1978 may explain why some former support-
ers of the project now wish to trim it back or extinguish it entirely. Clearly this is not
merely another academic undertaking. The collective experience and reputation of
the ALI and the reporters probably will give the final project instant credibility.
Moreover, few efforts of the ALI have touched the nerves of the established bar
and its clients as deeply as this project. It has the potential to cause a major impact on
the manner in which large corporations conduct their business and affairs. Many
business managers view the project as an unwarranted intrusion by lawyers and law
professors into an area about which they know little. Worse, their efforts are seen as
increasing the threats of litigation with uncertain results. Thus, even the seemingly
benign recommendations of "good corporate practice" are viewed as unsettling
because of the possibility that the recommendation is a modified mandate. Con-
sequently, an intense, political-like struggle has surrounded the ALI project in its
formative period, and compromises on most important provisions are likely.324
VI. WHAT Is THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE?
Determining the proper role for federal law in corporate governance is not
simply, or primarily, an analysis of the power of the Congress, federal agencies, and
federal courts, but rather is mainly a consideration of whether and how those bodies
should act. Policy, not power, is the main federalism issue in corporate governance,
and this may not be an issue of federalism at all.
This Article hopefully makes clear that the field of corporate governance and
corporate law is presently a mixture of federal and state roles. The national govern-
ment, acting through all of its instrumentalities, has chosen to act in numerous ways.
It sometimes makes substantive rules affecting corporations; it sometimes makes
detailed rules both as to substance and governance for specific industries that Con-
gress has identified as meriting special attention, and in some respects, it has chosen
to impose an overlay over state law rules. The main question is whether we should do
more or less of what we are already doing and how we should do it.
Proponents of change argue that change will occur only through federal action.
States are unlikely to act; voluntary action will be limited. In the late 1970s, a great
deal of voluntary action occurred both in self-regulatory organizations, such as the
324. Remarks of Roswell B. Perkins, president of the American Law Institute, at a Forum at the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (March 14, 1983).
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New York Stock Exchange, 325 and in individual companies.326 All of that action took
place against the backdrop of a keen interest by the SEC in the subject, and the threat
of possible federal legislation. With those external forces now quiet, a mood of
relaxation has set in, soothing corporate managers and lulling them into the apparent
belief that the present political climate will last forever. Recent opposition to the ALI
project demonstrates the fickleness of support for voluntary change.
Before any larger federal role is established, it would be helpful to test, or at
least to analyze, the effectiveness of existing federal efforts. National banks and
investment companies have experienced the most pronounced federal experience; all
companies have been affected by the impact of the federal securities laws. I am not
aware of any conclusive empirical study that convincingly demonstrates that federal
laws dealing with governance have improved shareholder or community welfare or
that the costs involved have outweighed probable benefits. Personal and shared
experiences, however, as well as a theoretical construct that appears reasonable
persuade me that the federal law affecting corporate conduct provides numerous net
benefits. Not all laws and regulations provide net benefits, of course, since we have
come to cheerfully discard numerous rules that burden without benefit. With regard
to much of the regulation, including tender offer regulation in the governance area, I
believe the jury is still out and the evidence produced so far does not carry the day.
This Article accepts as a premise that corrective action in corporate governance
is needed. The main problem to address is the inadequacy of the accountability
systems, and while no remedy is without flaws, improved internal monitoring sys-
tems, accompanied by realistic enforcement tools, are the preferred reforms. Other
corporate law changes, including the most fundamental one of defining the corporate
purpose and its social relationships, also are desirable.
Some, mostly economists and some law professors, vigorously contend that the
absence of empirical data to show the wisdom of the changes urged, together with
evidence that the markets function well to produce the desired effect, destroys any
argument in favor of governmentally imposed changes. Commentary by Professors
James Mofsky and Nicholas Wolfson upon the oral presentation of this Article was
strongly to that effect. In particular, they cite works by Stigler32 7 and McAvoy, 328 to
which they could add efforts by Jensen and Ruback, 329 Fama and Jensen, 330 Jarrell
and Bradley, 331 Easterbrook and Fischel, 332 and others. At most, all these writings
325. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 3.03 (1983 ed.).
326. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., Director Data (1982); Heidrick & Struggles, The Changing Board-1983 Update;
KornFerry International, Board of Directors-Eighth Annual Study (1981); New York Stock Exchange, Survey of Corpo-
rate Boards, Structure and Composition (1979).
327. Stigler & Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237 (1983).
328. McAvoy, Cantor, Dana, & Peck, AL! Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board of
Directors: An Economic Analysis, in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE's
PROPOSED "PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. " Ex. C
(1983).
329. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, II J. FIn. ECON. 5 (1983).
330. Famna & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301 (1983); Farna & Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
331. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 371 (1980).
332. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981).
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make a case that the market for corporate control, first identified by Henry Manne in
1965,333 is important and the law should tread lightly lest it impair the market's
effectiveness. The case is not made that the market for corporate control, or any other
market function, addresses all the problems that have been identified for reform,
much less addresses them all with total effectiveness. First, the market for control is a
blunt instrument that does not permit moderate solutions for moderately excessive
agency costs. Second, the tender offer, as the shining star in the market for control,
has profound extra-corporate and extra-shareholder impacts that no one has yet stud-
ied nor devised a protocol for study. Third, and most important, the evidence does
not demonstrate the scope of the market for control. That is, it may effectively
constrain management where its light is focused, but the stock of numerous public
companies is traded infrequently, not followed closely by analysts, and at best, come
within the weak side application of the efficient market hypothesis. Constraints other
than the market for corporate control are necessary when one dips much below the
Fortune 200.
If federal action is necessary, what should it be? Federal chartering, as urged by
a Nader task force3 34 and by this author, in a different form, 33 5 would replace state
law to a limited degree. That is, it would make federal law the exclusive law govern-
ing the affairs of the largest corporations. In many respects, this is an ideal solution
because it wipes the slate clean of all the barnacles of outmoded notions of gov-
ernance and the substantive content of corporation law. It ends the negative competi-
tion among states in their "race for the bottom."
336
In other respects, however, it is a far from ideal solution. To begin with, it
drains the energy of constructive thinking into a project that is almost certainly a
political impossibility. Congress will not adopt a federal chartering statute at the
present time nor in the foreseeable future.
Second, one cannot ignore the two hundred years of baggage that travel with our
system of state corporation law. Sweeping aside state law that has been the standard
since the beginning of the republic would jeopardize the benefits of a wealth of
experience. Moreover, the uncertainties that would affect the counseling of corpora-
tions and their advisors with the state system cast aside might cause unnecessary
confusion. 337.
However, the biggest objection that this erstwhile proponent of federal charter-
ing perceives at this time is the weakness in the legislative process. Congress seems
less capable of adopting major legislation at this time than at any time within mem-
ory. This is exemplified by the difficulties in having the Federal Securities Code even
introduced as a bill and the inability to legislate a national energy policy, to reform
the financial regulatory structure, and even to adopt an annual budget. Some attribute
Congress' paralysis to the dominance of special interest electioneering that has frag-
333. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
334. R. NADER, M. GRE, & J. SELtGMAN, supra note 19.
335. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
336. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
337. Garrett, The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in COMMENTARiES, supra note 12, at 96.
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mented Congress into many factions, each with a particular axe to grind and little
interest in consensus politics. The growth of grass roots movements, the diminished
importance of political machines, and the growing influence of television in politics
probably all partially are responsible for this. While this author is not a political
scientist and is not capable of analyzing the root causes of the change in our political
functionings, the results are plain to see.
Therefore, I am drawn away from the idea of what I once believed to be the best
approach to a search for a second best, and surely more modest approach, and one
that is not wholly dependent on massive legislative action. Congress can probably
only swallow bite-sized, predigested pieces, and if one attempts to conjure up a
gourmet banquet, he is likely to walk away from the table hungry.
Although it is far from complete, I believe that the American Law Institute's
project affords the best prospect for achievable reform. It retains our fundamental,
long-standing arrangement that acknowledges state chartering of corporations and the
primacy of state law, including existing choice of law standards. It creates national
standards of corporate governance, some of which I believe should be enacted into
federal law. The strong recommendations of the ALI, even if not enacted, provide
guidance to managers, lawyers, and judges to promote voluntary, or in some cases,
judicially imposed standards. At the same time, such recommendations and their
responses blunt the need for further legislative changes, and permit diverse solutions
to problems.
Federal agencies may also choose to adopt certain sections of the ALI Project
through rulemaking, which is a flexible form of legislation. The SEC would be a
particularly appropriate agency to enact portions of the ALI Project. In its regulation
of tender offer transactions, going private transactions, and corporate repurchases of
stock, fairness requirements may well include process and governance as an element
of the test. If the ALI adopts governance and substantive standards, this would afford
the SEC a sound basis for taking action embodying those standards in transactions
subject to the SEC's jurisdiction.
Rule changes affecting remedies are more complicated. The ALI recommenda-
tions dealing with derivative suits are complex and legislative in nature because of the
specificity of the rules. However, these rules may be taken as guidelines and safe
harbors to be used by courts as a standard to apply and are not necessarily dependent
upon implementation through legislation. It is appropriate to use a federal standard
for at least some remedies provisions but not necessarily all of them. Whether de-
rivative litigation may be terminated by boards of directors is a fundamental question
that affects the future viability of the derivative suit. The temptation is great for
corporate managers to attempt to enact into state legislation a rule which gives boards
broad discretion to terminate such litigation. A federal response that limits their
ability to do so in cases that are brought in federal court, whether they concern federal
claims or common law claims, is necessary, or may be so, to counter this movement.
The courts may require assistance in bringing about this result, either by legislation or
by changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Recognizing an important place for a federal role in corporate governance still
requires us to move with a degree of modesty and humility. That is to say, the
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relevance of corporate governance to improving the standards of corporate law is a
recently perceived wisdom. When the federal securities laws were first adopted, little
distinction was drawn between inside directors and outside directors, or between
management and the board of directors. Only recently have the business community,
its critics, and regulators become convinced of the desirability of at least a critical
mass of outside directors on boards of publicly-owned companies. The limitations of
legitimate expectations are not yet fully understood; 338 we have not lived with the
idea long enough.
What is proposed here as an appropriate federal role is not necessarily a package
deal, nor must it all be enacted at one time. Many people remain to be convinced that
governance reform has any importance at all. The cautions and thorough procedures
of the American Law Institute afford an opportunity for an excellent beginning to
think through the problem and the solutions which must follow to place reform of
corporate governance on a sound footing.
Another approach to federal involvement is through the adoption of federal
fiduciary standards as initially proposed by Professor Cary. 339 This would enable
federal law to focus on isolated problems rather than to wrestle with cosmic schemes
such as the structure of the board of directors. This is the traditional approach to
reform. Presently, most fiduciary standards are embodied in judge-made rules, which
have been criticized as being incapable of preventing fundamentally unfair
transactions. 340 The enactment of definite standards, for parent-subsidiary mergers or
tender offer responses, as examples, will permit predictability and relieve the courts
from an unsupportable burden of attempting to fathom fairness in given situations. 34 1
This approach rejects the notion of attempting to solve particular problems by creat-
ing the right mechanism for dealing with the problem, but directly solves the prob-
lem.
The very firmness of the solution is at once its strength and its weakness. It uses
the approach of Internal Revenue Code regulations in lieu of vague standards, but it
acts in areas of traditional equity jurisdiction where chancellors have long employed
experience and a sense of justice. The restatement approach of the ALI in part five,
which lacks legislative rigor, seems preferable. Lawyers are still undecided as to
whether directors' duties should be described as fiduciary duties or whether their
obligations merit some other term, yet courts have loosely applied the fiduciary
concept for centuries. A sudden fiat may cut the knot, all right, but may only create
new and unanticipated problems.
338. Despite the heavy emphasis that the American Law Institute, the American Bar Association and the SEC have
placed on independent directors, there remains considerable skepticism that the development has much significance.
Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982); Solomon,
Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MicH. L. REv. 581 (1978); Note, The
Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983).
339. Cary, supra note 247.
340. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974).
341. Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 203 (1981).
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Furthermore, state courts, in applying fiduciary standards, have not been the
weakest link in the current system of corporate law and governance.3 42 State courts
have shown the ability to adapt to new problems and to advance the law that they
have created. 34 3 State legislatures have been less responsive. 3 ' The area of state law
that requires most attention has been that portion which is legislatively dominated,
not judicially created. A legislative approach that did not draw bright lines but uses
only rough contours to shape federal fiduciary standards would burden federal courts
at a time when their overload has become a growing concern. 345 In terms of need, a
federal solution should focus on that which is in greater need of repair.
342. Schwartz, supra note 335, at 1136.
343. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977).
344. Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409 (1968).
345. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982).

